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0.2 ABSTRACT
Innovation, which is a major driving force of economic growth, has received much atten-
tion from economists. As a result, intellectual property rights, which allow the innovator
to recover their R&D cost from monopoly pricing, have obtained wide acceptance. On
one hand, these rights promote innovation and improve the social welfare in the long
run. On the other hand, they hurt the short-run consumer surplus due to their exclusiv-
ity rights. Creating a balance between such dynamic and static efficiency is a primary
concern for the policy makers. Many studies have addressed this question but reached
no consensus.
In chapter one, I reexamine the debate in the context of incremental innovation in
the pharmaceutical industry. I try to answer the following question: Should we grant
additional market exclusivity to incremental innovators in the pharmaceutical industry?
I assesses the welfare gains from incremental innovation in pharmaceuticals. Such in-
novation can yield consumer gains through improved quality, but the additional market
exclusivity granted to innovators may also delay generic entry, a practice referred to as
“evergreening”, and reduce consumer surplus. Quantifying this tradeoff is vital in de-
termining the optimal patent policy and regulatory treatment of incremental innovation.
To shed light on this problem, I focus on incremental innovations in selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) anti-depressant drugs. I estimate the patients’ demands for
antidepressants with a random coefficient logit model, based on individual-level pre-
scription drug data. By comparing scenarios of either withdrawing or allowing market
exclusivity for incremental innovations with scenarios of withdrawing or retaining incre-
mental innovations, I found that the consumer benefits from incremental innovation are
overwhelmed by the consumer surplus loss due to market exclusivity when considering a
single incremental innovation, whereas the consumer benefits from innovation outweigh
the consumer losses from exclusivity when considering the counterfactual of withdrawal
of all incremental innovations and market exclusivities. This result suggests that inno-
vation benefits are primarily driven not by the quality improvements of products but by
the competition effect of the introduction of several incremental innovation products in
the market.
In chapter two (coauthored with Roberta Dessı́), we turn our attention to the financial
aspects of the innovative activities. As we all know, there is a great monetary and creative
distance between an invention and its final market benefits. Venture capital specializes in
financing high-tech start-ups and therefore plays an important role in bridging scientific
discoveries and valuable business practices. Therefore, in this chapter, we review the
empirical evidence on the impact of venture capital on innovation. We identify some of
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the key challenges to empirical research in this area and discuss the methods that have
been used to address them. We propose a simplified theoretical model to illuminate
the potential endogeneity caveats by identifying the causal effects of venture capital on
innovation.
In chapter three (coauthored with Margaret K. Kyle), we revisit the work in chap-
ter one and continue to investigate the relationship between innovation and intellectual
property rights. In modern science and technology development, no advance is truly
original; all work is built upon previous innovations. Increasingly, scientists and re-
searchers are realizing the impedimentary effect of intellectual property rights on the
cumulative follow-up innovation (Bessen & Maskin (2009), Heller & Eisenberg (1998),
Murray & Stern (2007) and Williams (2013) etc.). Here we explore the potential effects of
intellectual property rights and research exemptions on cumulative advances in drug de-
velopment. We use new clinical trials as a measure of innovative effort and explore both
the variations in patent protections over time and countries as well as national statutory
research exemptions in different countries to identify the effect of patents on innovation.
Our results show that the overall effect of patent protection tends to promote innovative
activities; post-launch drugs facilitate the clinical trials conducted on them. Research ex-
emptions turn out to be associated with a lower level of follow-up innovation activities.
These three chapters of the thesis are self-contained, and each explores the economics
of innovation and intellectual property rights. Chapters one and three investigate the
relationship between intellectual property rights and innovation, i.e., the rationale of
granting the innovator intellectual property rights by exploring the pros and cons of
intellectual property rights. In chapter one, our conclusion is based on the consumer
welfare derived from innovation, and in chapter three we focus on promoting the future
innovation. Chapter two is more independent and investigates the financial provisions
of innovation activities.
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Chapter 1 Pharmaceuticals, Incremental Innovation and
Market Exclusivity
Nina YIN∗
Toulouse School of Economics
September 25, 2013
1 Introduction
”Incremental Innovations are not small achievements. Heat stable version of anti-retroviral drugs may
not be critically important to HIV patients in large cities where there is easy access to electricity and
refrigeration, but they are surely important to people in rural areas.”
Greg Kalbaugh, Director of US-India Business Council1
”Over the next few years, a number of blockbuster drugs face patent expiration. ... it is estimated
that by 2012, brands with more than $30 billion in sales will face new competition from generics. As
more brands face patent expiration, many manufacturers will face the dilemma of how to grow revenue
and minimize operational cutbacks as reliance on the new drug pipeline is unrealistic. One tactic is
to develop an extended release formulation of an existing brand. Whether you call it extended release
(ER, XR), long-acting (LA), or extra-long (XL), the modified formulation is intended to simplify dosing,
improve compliance and extend the life of the patent. (emphasis added)”
Kelly Renfro, Marketing Manager for McKesson Patient Relationship Solutions2
Innovation drives growth, but competition may undermine the incentives for innovation due
to the nonrivalrous nature of ideas. Market exclusivity, provided by intellectual property rights
and data exclusivity provisions, aims to incentivize innovation by allowing firms recoup their
R&D expenditures and extract the returns to investments in the marketplace. These policies are
controversial: How can we minimize dead-weight loss due to monopoly pricing without under-
mining incentives to innovate? This paper examine the welfare effects of incremental innovation
∗I deeply appreciate my advisor Margaret Kyle for her invaluable supports and suggestions in this work. And I
would like to thank Pierre Dubois, Jean-Pierre Florens, Yinghua He, Laura Lasio, Thierry Magnac, Fanny Camara,
Ying Fan, Martin O’Connell, Roger Moon, Christian Fons-Rosen, Alexander Sandukovskiy, Pasquale Schiraldi, Yuya
Takahashi, Sergio Urzua, Heidi Williams, Takuro Yamashita, and Xundong Yin for their illuminating discussions and
thank all the participants in EARIE-2012 Conference in Rome, applied microeconomics workshop, IP/IT workshop,
PhD workshop and Brown Bag Seminar at TSE, 10th CEPR/JIE School on Applied Industrial Organization, Conference
“The Economics of Intellectual Property, Software and the Internet”, 2013 China Meeting of the Econometric Society.





and delayed generic entry that results from granting additional market exclusivity periods to in-
cremental pharmaceutical innovations.
“Incremental innovation” in pharmaceuticals, in contrast to the radical innovation of a new
molecule to treat diseases, involves improvements over existing drugs such as the discovery of a
new therapeutic use, new formulation, additional pediatric use, or improved efficacy and safety.
The Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) grants innovators additional market exclusivity for incremental
innovations (details in Section 2). Although incremental innovation may generate social benefits,
additional market exclusivity may impose social costs. Market exclusivity implies an extension
of monopoly, which hurts consumer surplus: budget-constrained patients are may be unable to
purchase a treatment at all, or too little; this may in turn affect health status measures. I measure
the value of incremental innovation from an economic perspective. I estimate demand based
on individual prescription-level data for antidepressant use, and then calculate welfare under
various counterfactual policy scenarios. Specifically, I am interested in determining whether the
value of incremental innovation to patients exceeds the costs of extending market exclusivity.
This study contributes to policy debates in the regulation of pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and
intellectual property. Many have accused the pharmaceutical industry of “evergreening, ” or
extending patent protection through the introduction of new products that represent minor ad-
vances over older drugs. An oft-cited example is the case of Prilosec, a best-selling prescription
heartburn drug. Just before the expiration of Prilosec’s patent in April 2002, the producer of
Prilosec, AstraZeneca got approval for another drug, Nexium, in February 2001 and marketed it
from March 2002. Nexium is one-half of the Prilosec molecule. Most clinical studies found no
increase in efficacy. However, AstraZeneca obtained another patent that will expire in Novem-
ber 2018. But others point to examples of incremental innovation with important benefits. The
anti-retroviral drug Norvir, a first-line treatment of HIV/AIDS, was approved by FDA in 1996 but
requires refrigeration. In 2010, a heat-stable version of Norvir was introduced. While this incre-
mental advance may not be important for developed country patients, it may make treatment far
more accessible in countries without widespread refrigeration.
Even if incremental innovation yields real clinical benefits, the costs associated with extending
a monopoly – either through new patents or through Hatch-Waxman exclusivity extensions – may
be significant. Many developed countries are facing rising health care expenditure, a large portion
of which is due to pharmaceuticals. Regulators use a variety of mechanisms to control pharma-
ceutical expenditure, including price controls and the promotion of generics. As Lichtenberg
(2001) [20] has emphasized, the introduction of new drugs may reduce total health expenditure
and create other benefits, such as fewer inpatient visits and lost workdays due to illness. A full
examination of these trade-offs is essential in assessing efforts to balance cost, innovation and
access. Market exclusivity extensions are another policy tool that allows regulators to balance
incentives for incremental innovation that increases welfare against the static gains from earlier
generic entry (Grabowski (2006, 2008) [14] [13]; Engelberg (2009) [11]).
In the intellectual property area, there is a debate about the standards of patentability, partic-
ularly whether incremental innovation satisfies the novelty and nonobviousness requirement of
most patent systems. Some countries, including India, refuse to grant patents for some types of
incremental innovation. Giving innovators the same period of patent protection on an incremen-
tal advance as on a new molecule may distort incentives. Although this study doesn’t explicitly
consider the shift between incremental innovation and radical innovation, it might shed light on
the future research related to the substitution effects of these two types of innovation.
In this study, I focus on incremental innovations in selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
(SSRI) anti-depressant drugs, including the pediatric use of existing drugs, which has been granted
a six-month exclusivity extension over existing patents, and two new formulations of existing
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branded drugs (Lexapro and Paxil CR), which have been granted new patents. I estimate the pa-
tients’ demands for antidepressants with a random coefficient logit model, based on individual-
level prescription drug data. I then recover the marginal cost for the branded and generic firms
based on the Bertrand Nash model. Before calculating the welfare change from status quo to
counterfactual scenarios, I estimate counterfactual equilibrium prices from firms profit maximiz-
ing model, given the simulated demands over counterfactual alternative choice set (for example,
incremental innovation products might be removed, or the generic entry might occur one year
earlier due to the withdrawal of market exclusivity). Consumer surplus change is measured using
the compensating variation between two scenarios.
By comparing scenarios of either withdrawing or allowing market exclusivity for incremental
innovations with scenarios of withdrawing or retaining incremental innovations, I found that the
consumer benefits from incremental innovation are overwhelmed by the consumer surplus loss
due to market exclusivity when considering a single incremental innovation, whereas the con-
sumer benefits from innovation outweigh the consumer losses from exclusivity when considering
the counterfactual of withdrawal of all incremental innovations and market exclusivities. This
result suggests that innovation benefits are primarily driven not by the quality improvements
of products but by the competition effect of the introduction of several incremental innovation
products in the market.
This paper is structured as following: sections 2 and 3 explain market exclusivity policies
for pharmaceuticals and the antidepressant market, respectively. Section 4 details the estima-
tion strategy. Section 5 describes the data, including data sources, sample choice, products and
variables. Section 6 presents the estimation results, and I conclude section 7.
2 Background of Market Exclusivity
The pharmaceutical industry is innovation intensive, with firms investing a very high proportion
of annual sales into R&D; Additionally, their profitability relies heavily on patent protection. This
salient feature of the industry results from the characteristics of innovation and the production
process of the pharmaceuticals. The development of a successful branded drug is highly risky. To
get approval from government regulatory authorities such as FDA in the US, the median time du-
ration from the start of clinical trials to NDA (New Drug Application) issuance was 98.9 months.
In each phase, the attrition rate is surprisingly high (around 25%, 52%, 36% for phase I, II, III,
respectively, see Scherer, 2000[30]), resulting in large costs for clinical trials.
In comparison, the cost to copy a branded drug is remarkably low, not only for production but
also for approval from the government authority. According to the Hatch-Waxman Act passed in
1984, a generic producer could file an ANDA (Abbreviated New Drug Application) based only
on proof of bio-equivalence to the branded drug as long as its data exclusivity has expired. Once
generic drugs enter into the market, both the price and sales revenue of branded drugs tend
to drop about 80% over the next year. In this way, the length of patent protection governs the
profitability and effective life of pharmaceuticals.
Policy makers are continually trying to balance the need to develop new drugs and improving
patients’ access to existing drugs while maintaining affordable health expenditures. By allowing
generic producers to easily get approvals and market share, patients have access to blockbuster
drugs that otherwise might not be affordable. However, it greatly reduces the profits of innovators
and therefore undermines the incentives for them to carry out R&D for a new generation of drugs.
The objective of government regulator is to develop an optimal policy that maximizes total social
welfare while taking into account all these considerations.
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Market exclusivity is influenced by a complex interaction of several factors (Grabo-wski and
Kyle, 2007 [15]). In short, it is determined by the complementary action of patents and data exclu-
sivity. Patents granted by USPTO (The United States Patent and Trademark Office) protect drug
innovations from pure price competition, enabling drug innovators to recover research and de-
velopment expenditures and thereby encouraging further research investment. Data exclusivity
approved by the FDA restores the patent period loss during the regulatory review and clinical
trial period, as well as protects clinical data from being utilized by generic competitor to file
abbreviated new drug application (ANDAs)3.
To illuminate the importance of data exclusivity, one should examine the sophisticated nature
of pharmaceutical innovation and the market regulatory system. To ensure the safety and efficacy
of marketing drugs, the FDA sets a series of regulatory requirements throughout the whole devel-
opment process from the moment a new chemical entity is synthesized until final FDA approval
of a NDA. The process is divided into three main stages: preclinical research, clinical investiga-
tion, and NDA approval. It is well-known that the requirements are rigorous and demanding.
However, the patent term for pharmaceuticals remains unchanged, allowing 20 years after the
filing date for patents applied for after 1995; and 17 years after the issue date for patents applied
for before 1995.
This means that the effective patent life of pharmaceuticals is substantially shorter due to the
government requirements. When a firm discovers a promising new chemical compound, the first
thing to do is to file for a patent. From that moment, the patents 20-year term is on the clock,
well before knowing if the compound can be developed into a marketable medicine. The govern-
ment then requires substantial chemical, animal and human testing, followed with FDA review
process of a NDA. The testing and approval process usually takes about 7 to 13 years (Congress
House Committee, 1980) [27]. Therefore, for pharmaceutical products, the 20-year patent term
has become a legislative figment. In reality, the effective patent life for pharmaceuticals has been
eroded, and on average has only 6.8 years. The incentives to invest in pharmaceutical R&D have
been reduced substantially.
The Hatch-Waxman Act (1984) was enacted by Congress to alleviate this problem by restor-
ing market exclusivity to pharmaceutical innovations. In this act, two seemingly contradictory
goals have guided the federal government’s legislation: encouraging pioneer companies to con-
tinue developing innovative technologies while also making inexpensive generic pharmaceuticals
available to consumers.
According to Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic manufacturer is allowed to use the clinical data
of the patented drug to prepare its own FDA application prior to expiration of the patent rights,
thus providing an abbreviated process for FDA approval of generic drug applications. The generic
manufacturers can file abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) without their own clinical tri-
als data as long as they provide proof of bio-equivalence to the branded drug. This substantially
facilitates the entry of generic drugs (from 3 or more years to a few months, see CBO, 1998[26]).
On the other hand, the Act provides a partial restoration of the patent life of the research-based
drug company (the “pioneer”) by adding 5 years of data exclusivity without surpass the maximum
effective patent life of 14 years. The 5-year exclusivity is the period in which generic firms are for-
bidden from filing any ANDAs based on pioneer’s clinical trial data. Besides the NCE exclusivity,
Hatch-Waxman Act also provides other terms of data exclusivity:
1. Three years of exclusivity granted for a change in an approved drug product. The changes
include new indications, dosage strength, dosage form, route of administration, patient pop-
3Hutt (1982)[19] discusses the importance of patent term restoration to pharmaceutical innovation.
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ulation, and conditions of use. The changes require new clinical investigations and the ex-
clusivity could prevent effective approval (but not submission) of ANDAs.
2. Seven years of orphan-drug exclusivity. A company that develop such a drug (to treat a rare
medical condition which implies the condition affects fewer than 200, 000 people in the US)
could be protected from competition for seven years.
3. Six months of pediatric exclusivity. Unlike other exclusivity, the pediatric exclusivity could
be attached to existing periods of exclusivity and patent protection. It can be extended to
all approved formulations, dosage forms and indications for products that contain the same
active ingredient so long as they are protected by an exclusivity or patent. More than one
period of pediatric exclusivity is possible, e.g., new indication.
Within these three exclusivity periods, generic firms could file ANDAs, but they cannot get
approval from the FDA. Only after the expiration of the data exclusivity, their generic products
could be approved. However, only when the patent expires, the approved generic ANDAs could
be marketed.
In this sense, data exclusivity adds a new hurdle for the generic firms to enter the market.
Generic firms could also file and get approval of new drug application based on their own safety
and efficacy data, however, that implies they should carry out their own clinical trial, and it intro-
duces an immense amount of costs and uncertainty.
For pharmaceutical manufacturers, whether innovator or generic, their objective is to exploit
every market potential and extract maximum returns. For the innovator, they are protecting their
product from competition, restoring their patent terms and obtaining as long a data exclusivity
as possible. However, for the generic firm, they are trying every shot to challenge current patents,
and apply for ANDAs as early as possible to capitalize on market share. According to the Act,
the first-to-file ANDA generic can obtain a 180-day exclusivity in which FDA will not approve a
subsequently filed ANDA for the same product. Therefore, the competition of the branded and
the generic passed on to the arena of patent and data exclusivity. As quoted at the beginning of
our paper, the incremental innovation is one of the important strategies for the innovator to win
in this battle.
3 The Anti-depressant industry and SSRIs
In this paper, we focus on the antidepressant industry, more specifically, the Selective Serotonin
Reuptake Inhibitor antidepressants (SSRIs). The reason to concentrate on this market lies in the
following: molecules in this class are relatively homogeneous with individually idiosyncratic ther-
apeutic responses and side effects. Therefore, it is a differentiated but mutually exclusive market.
The products with patent protection, incremental innovations, and generic entry coexist. In this
sense, the market structure forms the indispensable ingredients (incremental innovation, market
exclusivity, consumer loss without generic entry) for answering our question. Market is competi-
tive with balanced share across brands, which facilitates the demand estimation.
The antidepressant manufacturing industry is the largest prescription industry in the United
States, withmore than 200million prescriptions dispensed annually for 2007-2011 (IMSHealth).4
Trends will likely continue upward with the rising diagnosis rates and increasing public aware-
ness of the disease. In fact, the World Health Organization forecasts that unipolar major depres-
sion will displace heart disease as the heaviest disease burden by 2020. [22] Furthermore, anxiety
4See the Top-line Market Data “Top Therapeutic Classes by U.S. Dispensed Prescriptions” in www.imshealth.com.
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disorders affect about 40 million American adults in any given year. They include panic disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
phobias. For these anxiety disorders, antidepressants are standard treatment.
Antidepressants are almost equal in their successes in relieving depression. The differences
determining patient choices, come down to safety, effectiveness, costs, side effects and the pres-
ence of other medical conditions that could affect the drug’s safety and effectiveness. Among
them, side effects are especially crucial considerations. Common antidepressant side effects are
nausea, weight gain, sexual dysfunction, and anxiety. Moreover, antidepressants are addictive,
and discontinuing use may cause withdrawal symptoms in patients. Reducing these side effects is
a vital area of research for pharmaceutical companies.
The diagnosis of depression involves more subjective criteria than other common diseases
such as arthritis, cancer, or diabetes. As a result, Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) advertising has his-
torically played a large role in creating popular recognition of depressive symptoms, “growing
market” and fostering a demand for specific medications. Studies show that only half of people
with depression are treated.[33] Thus, the success of new antidepressant treatments hinges on the
ability of manufacturers to effectively market their products to the public.
According to action mechanisms, the antidepressants can be categorized into several thera-
peutic subdivisions, 5 in which SSRIs are the most commonly used as the first-line treatment of
depression because of their favorable side effect profile and low toxicity. SSRIs also amount to
the top prescribed antidepressants in the US retail market in 2010.6 They work by preventing the
reuptake of serotonin by the presynaptic neuron, thus maintaining a higher level of serotonin in
the synapse. This allows the brain to better transmit signals, thus improving mood.
Prozac was the first SSRI marketed by Eli Lilly with FDA approval in 1987, later followed with
other SSRIs including Zoloft (1991), Paxil (1992), Celexa (1998), Lexapro (2002) and updated
versions, such as Prozac Weekly, Paxil CR etc.. After the added six-month of data exclusivity for
Prozac due to its pediatric studies expires in Aug. 2001, the generic competitors enter. Generic
counterparts for Paxil, Celexa and Zoloft then entered into the market in 2003, 2004 and 2006.
The most recent SSRI Lexapro also began to face its generic competitor after Mar. 2012.
Unlike most markets where consumers hold the full discretion in making choices, demand for
pharmaceuticals relies not only on ultimate patients’ tastes (the efficacy and side effects response,
brand loyalty), but also on the behaviors of physicians who prescribe these drugs and pharmacists
who dispense the prescriptions. Fortunately, unlike other therapeutic classes of drugs7, anti-
depressants leave little scope to physicians when they decide what to prescribe. The efficacy and
side-effect responses of anti-depressants are quite idiosyncratic across individuals. The traditional
way to prescribe anti-depressants is to try one or two molecules to see which works with the
fewest adverse reactions. According to patients’ responses, doctors then write the prescription
afterwards. In addition, people usually believe that physicians have incomplete or no information
about relative prices (Ellison et al., 1997 [10]), however, for the treatment of chronic disease,
exceptions happen (Caves et al. 1991[6]). Therefore, in our study, agency problems play little role
in choice decisions, which justifies the rationale of applying discrete choice model in our problem.
5The antidepressants mainly include the monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs),
tetracyclic antidepressants (TeCAs), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), and Serotonin-norepinephrine re-
uptake inhibitors (SNRIs).
6From the statistics in “2010 top 200 generic drugs by total prescriptions” and “2010 top 200 branded drugs by
total prescriptions” provided by www.drugtopics.com.
7Such as several chemically distinct but similarly working H2 antagonists used to treat duodenal ulcers; Several
ACE inhibitors used in the treatment of hypertension; And also numerous chemically distinct antibiotics.
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4 Estimation Strategy
The existing empirical literature has generally focused either on costs of market exclusivity or
the benefits of innovation. Several papers have examined the consequences of early generic en-
try through Paragraph IV challenges (Branstetter et al. 2011)[5]; others have estimated consumer
losses that would result from market exclusivity (Chaudhuri et al., 2006). [7] There is also a large
body of work on the benefits of innovations in healthcare. The representative studies include:
Trajtenberg (1989) [32] evaluates the value of CT scanners; Cleanthous (2011) [8] quantifies the
patient welfare benefits from innovation in the depression drugs class; Lucarelli and Nicholson
(2009) [23] and Dunn (2010) [9] calculate quality adjusted price indexes for colorectal cancer
drugs and anti-cholesterol drugs respectively, suggesting that the price increase in pharmaceuti-
cals are coming from the quality innovation.8 However, few analyses have considered both sides
simultaneously to answer whether the benefits of incremental innovation exceed the consumer
surplus loss from market exclusivity. Our study fills this gap by focusing on the effects of incre-
mental innovations in pharmaceuticals. Our approach roots from BLP random coefficient logit
model. This method has been adopted by many people to study the value of new products in
non-health related fields9 or health-related area. This paper is closely related to Dunn (2010) [9]
which applies BLP model with micro-level data in pharmaceutical industries.10
4.1 Demand Side Estimation
The patient choice decision of prescription drugs is complicated. Given the purchasing decision, it
could be viewed as the joint choice of the patient, the physician and the insurer. The patient relies
on his doctors to tell them which drug, if any, is best suited to treat his condition. At the same
time, the third-party payers might restrict the choice set according to the patient’s insurance plan
or induce price sensitivity through the structure of the insurance plan. However, the most pivotal
role in this choice making process is played by the patient’s heterogeneous reactions to the drugs,
especially in anti-depressant drugs where each individual responds very differently to the drugs,
regardless of the efficacy or side-effects. Therefore, in our modeling, we will ignore the principal-
agent relationship but regard the patient’s demand as a black box determined simultaneously by
individual characteristics and drug attributes.
Random coefficient model is a best fit to deal with this problem. In this model, consumer’s util-
ity is determined by the interaction of drug characteristics (including prices)with both observable
and unobservable demographic characteristics, which allows for flexible substitution patterns.
The patient choice in antidepressants is best suited to discrete choice model: patients consume
only one anti-depressant at a time which is exactly an underlying assumption of the discrete
choice model.11.
Consider that a utility-maximizing patient i, where i = 1, . . . , It , in a given time period t, where
t = 1, . . . ,T , faces Jt + 1 alternatives: Jt different antidepressant drugs and the option of not pur-
chasing any of the drugs, the outside option, j = 0. As in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995,
8There are still a lot, such as Lichtenberg (2001, 2005) [20] [21] has studied the impact of the introduction of new
chemical entities on the health status. Hsieh and Sloan (2008) [17] underline that the estimated benefits of adopting
pharmaceutical innovation generally far exceed the costs.
9Based on BLP model, Petrin (2002) [28] studies the value of minivan introduction; Nevo (2003) [25] measure the
welfare effect of new products and quality change in breakfast cereal industry.
10 However, Dunns paper does not allow random coefficients but uses a conditional logit model.
11In our sample, we observe that some of the individuals may choose different drugs in different time, which is the
evidence that patients are changing to a more suitable drug. Therefore, we will drop the former drug choice and only
keep the latter one since it better reflects the patient’s characteristics
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2004) [2] [3] and Nevo (2000) [24], the indirect utility of any patient i, in market t choosing drug
j can be expressed as
uijt = βiptxjpt +
∑
k
xjktβikt + ξjt + ǫijt .
with





cr + vic, c = p,k.
The payoff of patient i purchasing drug j at date t depends on the drug price xjpt and drug
characteristics, including xjkt (observable) and ξjt (unobservable). We allows patients to have
heterogeneous preferences over observed drug attributes xjct , c = p,k,
12 through the coefficients
βict . The coefficients vary both with observable patient characteristics zirt , indexed r = 1, · · · ,R and
unobservable household characteristics vic, indexed c = 1, · · · ,K .
13 We assume vic ∼N (0,Σ), ǫijt to
be a zero-mean stochastic term.
For notation simplicity, in the following we will omit the market notation t. By grouping the
drug-specific common term together, we get:








xjcvic + ǫij , (1)
with δj =
∑
c xjcβ̄c + ξj , we call it as the mean utility component of drug j , which is common to all
patients in market t.
For the outside option, as in Griffith et al. (2010) [16], the individual utility takes the following
form




where zir for r = 1, · · · ,R, is a vector of observable individual characteristics. We interact the payoff
provided by selecting the outside option with observable individual characteristics to allow for
heterogeneity in choices to buy or not. The parameter δ0 capture the baseline payoff from the
outside option and for each r, β1r captures the variation in payoffs across individuals due to zir .
Individual i chooses drug j which gives him/her the highest payoff, i.e., uij > uil ,∀l , j, l ∈
{0, · · · , J}. Then, by assuming the random utility component ǫij to be independent and identically
distributed across both drugs and patients and follows an extreme value distribution, we can write
the probability of individual i choosing drug j as
















In the above formula, we can observe the patient’s choice results (therefore, Pri(j)), the drug char-
acteristics xlc, and the individual characteristics zir . For the unobservable individual characteris-
tics, by assumption, we have v ∼N (0,Σ), 14 then after integrating out v,
Pri(j | z,x,δ,β) =
∫
Pri(j | z,v,x,δ,β)Pv(dv). (3)
12p denotes price, k denote other drug characteristics, c denotes all the drug attributes.
13 It implies the unobservable individual preference specific to drug characteristics.
14Here, v is a coefficient vector which corresponds to the drug characteristics xlc .
8
A general concern in demand estimation is that unobservable drug characteristics lead to cor-
relation between the error term and price resulting in inconsistent estimates of the price coeffi-
cients. The traditional way to circumvent this problem in mixed logit model is to introduce the
mean utility term δjt which encompasses the price and unobserved product characteristics (BLP,
1995, 2004 [2] [3]). Therefore, a consistent estimates of δjt , β
o
cr and Σ are implementable. And
then we could deal with the endogeneity problem in linear model
δj = β̄pxjp +
∑
k
xjk β̄k + ξj . (4)
by instrumental variable estimation. In this way, the model can be estimated in two stages: δj ,
βocr , and Σ are estimated from (2) by simulated maximum likelihood estimation; And then based
on the estimates of δj in the first stage, β̄c and ξj are estimated from (4) by IV estimation.
4.2 Instrumental Variables
Finding relevant and valid instruments is always challenging in demand estimation. It should
correlate with the drug price but be uncorrelated with unobserved drug characteristics ξjt . A
usual way in the literature is to find the cost factors in other countries or the competitors which
affects the firms’ pricing strategy but irrelevant to the product characteristics.
In our study, to exploit the detailed individual-level data, we adopt a different approach by
Dunn (2010) [9] and adapt the demand predicts in the first stage logit estimates as IVs, but with
drug prices and the unobserved product characteristics set to zero. The intuition behind the IV
strategy is to employ the demographic information in the patient-level data which is reflected
in the first stage demand estimates since choices are affected by individual characteristics. The
individual information is controlled in the logit model and it shouldn’t enter the unobserved
component of model, ξjt . Therefore individual demographics should not be correlated with the
unobserved component of demand; but the aggregate preferences of individuals in the market
should be correlated with the price. As the firm’s price strategy in oligopolistic model depends on
both the demand of the drug and the derivative of demand with respect to price, Dunn (2010) [9]
provides a detailed proof regarding the use of aggregated demographics as instrumental variables
in the context of a simple linear demand model. Graynor and Vogt (2003) [12] utilized the first-
stage demand estimates from the logit maximum likelihood equation as an instrument for price.
Similar to their methods, assume that firms choose price based on a mark-up term derived from
an oligopoly pricing model that depends on both the demand for the product and the derivative




. Both the demand function and
the derivative can be calculated by summing individual decisions and their responses to price.
Specifically, the market demand for product j at date t is simply:
Djt(j | z,x,δ,β) =
It∑
i=1
Prit(j | z,x,δ,β) (5)









The first-stage estimates may be used to construct these demand measures, but they are likely
to be endogenous because the function Prit(j | z,x,δ,β) depends on the market price, pjt , and
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the unobservable, ξjt . Therefore, in order to use the first-stage estimates, the terms containing
price, pjt , and the unobservable, ξjt , must be removed from the equation; so to construct the
instruments all parameters interacted with price, β̄p, β
o
pr , vip, are set equal to zero, and the mean
utility of product δjt is also equal to zero. That is, (5) and (6) are estimated at the point where
Prit(j | z,x,δ = 0, β̄p = 0,β
o
pr = 0, vip = 0,βic). Therefore, by representing all these price related
parameters β̄p, β
o
pr and vip as βp, we could construct the instruments as
Djt(j | z,x,δ = 0,βp = 0,βk),
and
∂Djt(j | z,x,δ = 0,βp = 0,βk)
∂pj
.
For generic drugs, we could expect that the pricing behaviour of generic firms be different from
branded firms and the competition extent also different. By allowing the instrument to be distinct
from the branded drugs, we have the instruments for generics as:
genericjt ·Djt(j | z,x,δ = 0,βp = 0,βk),
and genericjt ·
∂Djt(j | z,x,δ = 0,βp = 0,βk)
∂pj
.
Another group of IVs have also been considered in our study. Adopting the instruments em-
ployed in Branstetter et al. (2011) [5], we generate three alternative instruments to perform the
robustness check. The variables includes: the number of dosages in which a product is available;
years after the first generic entry; and number of firms (branded and generics) selling the same
molecule in the market. The relevance and validity of all these instruments will be discussed in
section 5.
4.3 Supply Side Estimation
Counterfactual simulations concerning the effects of incremental innovation withdrawal andmar-
ket exclusivity removal require knowledge of the marginal costs of SSRI anti-depressants in the
market. Adopting the traditional approach in the literature, we assume that the marginal cost
mcjt is constant and the industry is an oligopoly engaging in Bertrand competition with differen-
tiated products. Firms myopically maximize profits each period, and then the firms’ first-order
conditions can be derived and used to infer the marginal costs.
Following the literature, we assume the firms are profit maximizers. Based on the typical
Bertrand-Nash model, assume firm f produces subset Jt of the J total products





(pj −mcj )Dj (7)







15In our case, most of the firms have only one product except Forest Labs (producer of Celexa and Lexapro) and
Glaxosmithkline (producer of Paxil and Paxil CR). Before the patent expiration of Celexa, Forest Labs developed a new
transforms of Citalopram Hydrobromide (active ingredient of Celexa): Escitaloproam Oxalate. When pricing Celexa
(Lexapro), Forest Labs should consider the substitive effects of Lexapro to Celexa.
10
Rewrite it in matrix form, the mark-up can be calculated by:
p −mc = ∆(p,X,β)−1D(p,X,β), (9)





if j and l are produced by the same firm;
0 otherwise.
However, there are some exceptions in our study due to our data limitation. Our individual-
level data, while providing detailed individual characteristics and purchasing history, contained
inaccurate records about the drug manufacturers, especially for generics16. We could identify
the producer if the patient purchased the branded one since there is unique branded producers
corresponding to each molecule. For generics, it becomes a problem as there are dozens of phar-
maceutical producers providing generics of the same molecule. Therefore, the only thing we can
do is to treat all generics of one molecule as a single product although in fact they are provided
by multiple competitors. In this case, the firm margins will be overestimated based on Bertrand-
Nash model.
At the same time, there are two important phenomena in our market which illustrate us that
simply assuming perfect competition or oligopoly market over all these years might be inappro-
priate. Phenomena 1: generic manufacturers enter the market sequentially following the patent
expiration of the branded. Due to the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first generic entry could obtain 180
days of market exclusivity, which implies that within that period, the FDA cannot allow the sec-
ond generics to enter and the first generics could enjoy a certain level of market power. While after
the expiration of market exclusivity, generics firms flush into the market, for example (see Table
16), after Zoloft lost its patent protection, only Teva17 entered in 2006, while in 2007, there were
overall 16 generic producers entered. Phenomena 2: many generic firms simultaneously produce
several product line. For example, Teva and Mylan (internationally well-known generic produc-
ers) produce four molecules. Phenomena 1 tells us that the market transition from oligopoly to
perfect competition experiences a gradual process, it involves regulatory approval, entry into the
market, and patient education about the availability of new drugs. Phenomena 2 implies that
the firms also care about the substitution effects across generics with SSRI subclass when pricing.
However, we can’t capture this substitution effect based on our data.
Another issue we haven’t tackled is the role of prescription drug copayment rates. According
to Medicare Part D, the federal government started to subsidize the costs of prescription drugs for
Medicare beneficiaries in the US from Jan. 2006. Several studies 18 have quantified the effects of
Medicare Part D in overall drug utilization and generics use and illustrated that the assessment
of Medicare Part D is complex due to its wide varieties of plans. There are rising concerns about
pharmaceutical studies to recover price elasticity based on prices rather than copayment rate. 19
This is especially true with the introduction of Medicare Part D drug insurance.20 Without tak-
16The NDC (national drug code) recorded in MEPS which is used to link the products to manufacturers are highly
inaccurate and incomplete. We could only observe the drug name and strength for each purchasing record. For the a
large number of generics which are highly homogeneous in trade name and strength, we were unable to identify their
manufacturers.
17Teva and Ivax Sub Teva Pharms are all from the same group.
18See Yin et al. (2008) [34] and Zhang et al. (2008) etc.. [35]
19Arcidiacono et al. (2012)[1] build a pharmaceutical pricing model incorporating the insurance co-payment rate
and provide reasonable elasticity estimates. Brand et al. (2012)[4] also discusses the importance of copayments rather
than prices in health care studies.
20Zhang et al.(2012) [36] has found that Medicare Part D coverage gap was associated with modest reductions in the
use of antidepressants and those with generic drug coverage reduced their brand-name antidepressant prescriptions.
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ing into account the copayment rate, price elasticity tends to be overestimated, which induces
underestimated firm margins. While due to our data limitation, treating all generic competitors
as a single producer tends to overestimate firm margins. These two biases act in opposite di-
rections, making our cost recovering difficult and complicated. These issues remind us that the
interpretation of Bertrand Nash model should be very careful. The method used to estimate the
counterfactual prices with consideration of these issues will be discussed in the next section.
4.4 The Counter-factual Scenarios and New Equilibrium Prices
In assessing the effects of incremental innovation, we start by focusing on the most extreme case,
in which incremental innovations are non-existent. Only the originals and their generics circulate
in the market. Illustrating by Table 1, the product sets include only column 1 and 4. We use the
results from the analysis of this case as a benchmark. In the next step, we consider withdrawal of
each type of incremental innovation respectively. Therefore, in total, we have four cases:
• Withdrawal of all incremental innovations and the corresponding additional market exclu-
sivity: remove column 2-3;
• Withdrawal of new formulated version of Celexa: Lexapro.
• Withdrawal of new formulated version of Paxil with safety improvement: Paxil CR;
• Withdrawal of pediatric usage for all products and the corresponding 6-month market ex-
clusivity: drop column 3 and remove the pediatric usage for all the rest products;21
Although we have discussed several different types of data exclusivity granted to innovation
in Section 2, the data exclusivity granted to incremental innovations in our market are only those
for pediatric studies. Three years of data exclusivity granted to the firms for new indications were
overlapped with patent protection and therefore they have played no role in extending market ex-
clusivity.22 However, the patent protection for the newly formulated products, such as Lexapro,
create another barrier for generic competition. Therefore, in our counterfactual analysis, the mar-
ket exclusivity we consider are the 6-monthmarket exclusivity granted to Prozac, Paxil, and Zoloft
for their pediatric studies23 and the patent protection for Lexapro and Paxil CR.
As the above list suggests, we proceed from analyzing the effects of withdrawal of the entire
incremental innovations to the analysis of eliminating a specific type of incremental innovation.
This approach was motivated by the observations that market exclusivity extension, provided by
Hatch-Waxman Act and intellectual property right, are specific to each type of incremental inno-
vation. By considering separately the introduction of each incremental innovation and accompa-
nied market exclusivity extension, the welfare effects could be evaluated and policy implications
could be drawn.
Before carrying on the counter-factual analysis, the first step is to derive the new equilibrium
prices under counter-factual scenarios. In deriving these prices, we start by assuming profit max-
imization pricing policy for the branded firms without generic entry. Such assumptions aim to be
consistent with the price making assumptions in marginal cost estimation. Before generic entry,
21It implies that the following products will no longer have the pediatric usage indication: Prozac (2006), generic
Prozac (2003), Prozac (2006), generic Prozac (2006), Zoloft (1991), Zoloft (2002), Zoloft (2003), Generic Zoloft (2006).
22The reason that we don’t consider new indications in SSRIs also lies in the fact that there is almost no significant
effects of new indication dummies over the mean utility of drugs from our estimates.
23Although the safety and efficacy of the medication for the treatment of Major Depressive Disorder has been built
only for Prozac. The safety and efficacy of the treatment for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder has also been developed
for Zoloft.
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the branded firms re-optimize in response to the market change and set new prices, taking the
prices of all other firms as given. However, after the generics flood the market, as we explained
in section 4.3, the counterfactual prices estimated from biased marginal cost in new equilibrium
might be misleading. As we already know, Bertrand Nash model overestimates the margin of
firms in case of generic competition, therefore underestimates the marginal cost in case of generic
competition. Upon underestimated marginal costs and overestimated margins in Bertrand Nash
Model, the estimates of counterfactual prices are inaccurate and the direction of bias is unpre-
dictable, not to mention the copayment rate issue.
Therefore, one way to deal with these issues, is to consider only the pre-2006 markets and
calculate counterfactuals for the years before 2006. Another way to include all these years is to
infer the counterfactual prices from the marketplace prices rather than from estimated marginal
costs for the years after 2006. For example, consider the counterfactual of withdrawal of pediatric
exclusivity of Prozac, the counterfactual price of Prozac in this scenario is set to be the market-
place price one year later (i.e., the generic competition come to the market one year earlier, which
drop down the price one year earlier).
4.5 Measurement of Welfare Effect
The simulation of the new equilibrium under different scenarios can provide important insights
into how consumers and firms will respond to the removal of incremental innovations and addi-
tional market exclusivity (for example, which products consumers will substitute or which prices
will decrease the most). To get a more precise idea of how patient’s well-being will ultimately
be affected by the policy removal (withdraw the additional market exclusivity granted to the
incremental innovation), we compute, as the last step in our analysis, the welfare effects if the
regulators no longer grant additional market exclusivity to incremental innovations.
One point we should make it clear is that in this study we have no attempt to evaluate the
responsiveness of incremental innovation to market exclusivity policies, which is left for future
research. For this moment, we assume that if no additional market exclusivity is provided by
regulators, no incremental innovation would take place. However, it should be acknowledged
that the assumption might not hold as long as the expected gain of demand increases due to
incremental innovation is greater than the investment cost, which might happen as improved
quality can distinguish products from other competitors and therefore increase the demands.
These issues are important and relevant to our study but we can’t provide the answer to them
with the current dataset. It involves requires additional study which might be the direction of
our future research. But we are sure that incremental innovation would be reduced with the
removal of market exclusivity provisions. By assuming the extent of withdrawal of incremental
innovation, we could provide the lower bound and upper bound of the estimates to our question.
Social welfare, as defined, includes consumer surplus and firm profits. The easier part, firms’
profits, can be calculated by demands multiplying the difference between price andmarginal cost.
Our data don’t allow us to measure the investment cost of incremental innovation, which requires
the R&D input in incremental innovations for each firms. We will put this issue tentatively aside
and discuss it after we get the final results.
On the consumer side, we measure changes in consumer welfare by the compensating vari-
ation (CV), defined as the additional expenditure that consumers need in order to achieve the
















where period t − 1 and t are the different product characteristics corresponding to different sce-
narios (before and after the incremental innovation happens or before and after the market exclu-













∫ ln[∑Jtj=0 exp(V tij )]− ln[∑Jt−1j=0 exp(V t−1ij )]
βip
dPv(v).
Note that the CV as computed above can be decomposed into two effects. To illustrate it, let’s first
clarify the notations: incremental innovation is denoted as II and additional market exclusivity
as ME. The welfare change from the counter-factual scenario to the real situation can be written
as:
∆ =W (II ,ME)−W (no II ,no ME), (10)
where W (II ,ME) implies the consumer welfare where there is incremental innovation and addi-
tional market exclusivity, similarly, no II , no ME denotes the scenario where there is no incre-
mental innovation and additional market exclusivity.
By manipulating equation 10, we have
∆ = {W (II ,no ME)−W (no II ,no ME)}+ {W (II ,ME)−W (II ,no ME)} (11)
From equation 11, the consumer surplus can be interpreted as the sum of welfare loss resulting
from withdrawal of incremental innovation and the gains from removal of additional market
exclusivity, which is exactly the two blocks of values we are interested in.
If ∆ is positive, then it implies that granting additional market exclusivity to incremental in-
novation is valuable since their loss is offset by their benefits. Therefore, we could separately
measure the two terms in braces to get the estimate of ∆. For the first term, we will measure
the welfare effect from product quality improvements without providing market exclusivity; Sec-
ondly, we will consider the price effects of extendingmarket exclusivity while keeping the product
quality unchanged with improved level.
Considering the four cases we discussed above, ∆ will be calculated separately corresponding
to each case. For example, for case 3, ∆ is the sum of consumer gains from pediatric usage of the
SSRIs without the market exclusivity extension plus the loss of providing the market exclusivity
to all the pediatric studies.
5 Data
5.1 Data Sources
Three data sources are employed for this study: the consolidated individual data, medical condi-
tion data, and prescribedmedicine event data from theMedical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
from 1996 to 2009, the information about new drug application and patent/data exclusivity for
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drugs from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and self-collected data about the drug
characteristics from package insert labels.
MEPS provides nationally representative estimates of health care uses, expenditures, sources
of payment, and health insurance coverage for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population.
It follows all the individuals in randomly selected US families for 2 years with 5 rounds of ques-
tions, information recorded includes respondents’ health status, demographic and socio-economic
characteristics, health insurance, medical expenditure, etc.. More importantly, it supplements the
survey data by contacting medical providers and pharmacies to acquire detailed and accurate
consumption and billing information. For example, if the patient reports purchasing Norvir from
a pharmacy, the pharmacy is contacted and required to provide the purchasing history of Norvir
for the patient. The survey began 1996 and the most recent wave from 2010 is available. Overall,
there are 239,720 individuals including in the survey from 1996 to 2009.24
Two datasets from the FDA (Drug@FDA and Orange Book) provide exhaustive information
on the drug approvals, supplemental approvals, patent, and data exclusivity. For each approval,
whether it is a radical innovation (new molecule entity) or incremental innovation (new formu-
lation, new indication, and new combination) is documented. The subsequent supplemental
approvals (including the safety, efficacy, new indication, new strength, new formulation, label
change, patient population change) following each approved drug could be tracked in the FDA
database. The information is critically indispensable for our study to identify incremental inno-
vation from radical innovation.
Moreover, the drug characteristics (the strength, dosage form, active ingredient, producer, ap-
proval date, patent expiration date, data exclusivity expiration date, type of data exclusivity, etc.)
are all available from the FDA. Based on this information, we could generate several important
drug characteristics such as dummy of generics and age of molecule for each drug. The only flaws
is that it only provides the unexpired data exclusivity information, i.e., once the data exclusivity
expires, the information about expiration date, exclusivity type becomes absent from the available
dataset. Fortunately, we could uncover the expiration date of the expired drugs from the entry
of other competitors (ANDAs approval or marketing date). As a complementary source, USPTO
provides more detailed information on the patent and their expiration. To link the MEPS con-
sumption data with FDA drug data, NDC data file in FDA plays an important role in making the
match.
A unique self-collected data is utilized in our study. By reviewing the package insert label for
each drug, we construct several variables of drug attributes. These variables mainly lie in two
aspects: the indications and side effects25. Indications are noted in each label and remain the
same until the supplement approval has been granted for new indication. We generate several
dummies of indications for each drug. We also collect the side effects information for each drug
from the clinical trial data. Due to the heterogeneity of the clinical trial across drugs in the sense
of the composition of the patients, the drug strength, the length of the clinical studies, etc., the
original statistics is not comparable across drugs. To make the statistics meaningful across drugs,
we generate variables for each symptom: the ratio of the occurrence rate of the symptom for the
patients taking drugs over the occurrence rate for the patients taking placebo26.
24When we started the data cleaning, the data from 2010 wasn’t yet available.
25There is also information about FDA safety alarms to health professionals and patients about drugs. The alarms
usually happen several years later after the approvals, when the patients utilization of the drug reveals more safety
problems. For this category (SSRI), all the drugs have been received the same FDA alarm and therefore, we cannot
identify this variable without variation and therefore we didn’t include it into our study.
26The details to construct side effect variables are illustrated in Appendix A.2.
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5.2 Products and Incremental Innovations
Our focus is on four active ingredients in selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) anti-depressant
drugs, denoted in ATC code as N06AB-. 27 It involves four new molecule entities following with
12 incremental innovations and subsequent generics. 28 Prozac Weekly, Sarafem, as incremental
innovations of Prozac are not included in this study due to their limited number of observations.
As shown in Table 1, following the marketing of four new molecule entities: Celexa (1998),
Paxil (1992), Prozac (1987), Zoloft (1991) 29, subsequent updated generations are innovated. In
our paper, to consider the incremental innovation, we mainly focus on the pediatric use of SSRIs
and newly formulated drugs with new drug application to the FDA, such as Lexapro and Paxil
CR. New indication uses will not be considered in this paper because the data exclusivity granted
to the new indications in our study doesn’t extend the market exclusivity due to a longer patent
period. Our results, as demonstrated below, illustrate that the utility from new indications is not
significant and also ignorable. 30
If we define products as the drug with constant characteristics, then an updated version im-
plies a new product; therefore, overall there are 12 products plus an outside option in our analysis.
The indications for each drug are listed in Table 13 and the side effects for each molecule are also
shown in Table 14. 31 Unlike most of the literature which treat drugs in different formulation
and different strength as different products, in my study, I treat them as one product, since most
depression drugs are administered once daily, I use weighted price across strength and formula-
tion as the product price without further adjustment. Treating these simialar drugs as different
products will make the estimation computationally burdensome without gaining benefits.
Products from branded firms and generic producers are distinguished. But we find it from
the Table 14 and 13 that the characteristics of the branded drug and the generic one are similar
in terms of indications and side effects because of the current legislation (Hatch-Waxman Act:
Generic drugs can provide only the proof of bio-equivalence to branded drugs to get abbreviated
new drug approval from FDA without carrying on clinical trials but building their safety and
efficacy on the clinical data of the branded counterpart). As shown in Table 14, side effects data
remain the same for all drugs with the same molecule across years. Finally, the summary statistics
of the attributes for these drugs are listed in Table 5.
The additional market exclusivities granted to the incremental innovations in SSRIs include:
27According to the WHO ATC index, there are nine substances which have ever been approved as medicines. (See
http://www.whocc.no/atc ddd index/ and search N06AB.) However, three of them have been withdrawn due to safety
problem, leaving only 6 molecules in the US market: Citalopram Hydrobromide, Escitalopram Oxalate, Fluvoxamine
Maleate, Fluoxetine Hydrochloride, Paroxetine Hydrochloride, and Sertraline Hydrochloride. Among them, Fluvox-
amine Maleate is omitted in our analysis because of ignorable market share. Finally we only focus on the remaining
five active ingredients.
28Escitalopram Oxalate is basically a new formulation of Citalopram Hydrobromide, and therefore, we will treat it
as an incremental innovation instead of a new molecule entity.
29Enclosed in the parenthesis are the year of first approval.
30The market exclusivity granted to new indication or new formulation only protects the updated drug from generic
competition, however, the exclusivity for original new molecule entities will expire as usual. We can see from Table
1 that, while the marketing of new version of branded drugs, the generics entered as well. Nevertheless, even with
market exclusivity extension on the new indication, the drug producer would generally need a new dosing strength
or formulation to make this commercially reasonable since doctors could, and would, write prescriptions for the old
version for the new indication. In this sense, it can be expected that the generics could obtain the new indication
characteristics as the branded one as long as the drug strength or formulation are the same.
31Side effects data keep the same for all drugs with the same molecule which is obtained from the clinical data of
branded drug. After Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, generics could enter into the market based on the clinical data of
branded counter-parts with only providing the bio-equivalence to the branded one. Therefore, we could expect that
the side-effects of the generics remain the same as the branded one.
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• Prozac was approved for additional six month pediatric exclusivity for its pediatric usage
which extend their market exclusivity from Feb. 2001 to Aug 2001;
• Paxil obtained 6-month exclusivity for its pediatric studies extend its market exclusivity
from Sep. 2015 to Mar. 2016;
• Zoloft obtained 6-month exclusivity for its pediatric studies extend its market exclusivity
from Dec. 2005 to June 2006;
• Lexapro obtained 6-month exclusivity for its pediatric studies extend its market exclusivity
from Sep. 2011 to Mar. 2012.32
5.3 Sample Selection
As shown in Table 3, among the 239,720 respondents inMEPS, only those with depression (25,001,
92.9 %) 33 34 and those who has no depression but purchased SSRI anti-depressants (1,914, 7.1%)
are included in our analysis. 12,815 (47.6%) of the whole sample have ever purchased SSRI drugs.
The rest of the patients: 7,298 (27.1%) had never purchased the drugs, 6,802 (25.3%) purchased
other anti-depressants. The individuals who purchased drugs construct the demand of these
products, and the patients who had condition but didn’t purchased SSRI drugs make up of the
potential market size, we regard them as choosing the outside option.
There is another potential group of patients unobserved in our sample due to their mild con-
dition for which they never sought treatment, and are not reported in the survey. Therefore, we
cannot include them. We believe this approach is reasonable as depression is the type of condition
that only becomes a disease when it disturbs the mood of the patients and severely affects thier
daily life.
As we know, depression is a chronic disease which requires long-term medication treatments.
Therefore, refills and repeated purchasing are very common in the survey. Implementing a maxi-
mum likelihood estimation based on the full sample is computationally burdensome. Therefore,
we will drop them accordingly. In our data, 104,143 purchasing events for the 12, 815 individuals
are documented. 70,937 observations are refills and 18,186 are repeated purchasing, which are
dropped from our sample and left with 15,020 observations. Among them, 2, 205 observations
are switching drugs. For the records with switching, we keep the later drug as their choice and
drop the earlier ones. We believe that patients are switching to find a better fit for their condi-
tion. Therefore, we have 12,815 purchase records for 12,815 individuals plus 14, 100 patients
who chose outside option kept in our study.35 As evidenced in Table 4, the deletion of refills and
repeated purchasing has little effect on our demand estimation since the market share remains
more or less the same between the MEPS survey sample and our analytic data.
32We will not investigate the withdrawal of this exclusivity since the time span is out of our data scope.
33According to the ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes, if the respondent has condition with code 296 (Episodic mood disor-
ders), 300 (Anxiety, dissociative and somatoform disorders) or 311 (Depressive disorder not elsewhere classified), then
we regarded them as having depression.
34The condition can be recorded in MEPS for the following reasons: 1. reported by the household respondent for
a particular medical event (hospital stay, outpatient visit, emergency room visit, home health episode, prescribed
medication purchase, or medical provider visit); 2. reported as the reason for one or more episodes of disability days.
3. Reported by the household level respondent as a condition ”bothering” the person during the reference period.
35Alternative sample selection method is to keep the observations in individual-year level rather than in individual
level since in our analysis, years implies different market with different choice sets and prices. The difficulty in this
lies in that the observations will be almost doubled (44,332 vs. 26,915): Estimating a maximum likelihood model with
12 products in 26,915 observations is already computationally burdensome, requiring around 100GB of memory and
more than 3 days to process. Doubling the observations makes the current computation resources unsustainable.
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5.4 Variables
The dependant variable used in this paper is the treatment choice dummy of each patient in a
period. The treatment choices include the drugs products we illustrate above in section 4.2 and
an outside option. Here, we assume if an individual purchase the drugs, he is considered to be
taking the medicine, i.e., choiceit = 1. Patients’ compliance to the medication isn’t considered in
our context.
The details of data construction for the individual characteristics and drug attributes are de-
scribed in Appendix A. The individual demographics that we use include Ageit , Adultit
36,Maleit .
The socio-economic variables include Years of educat− ionit and Family income per capitait .
Family income per capita is generated by average the total family income across individuals. In-
come is deflated and measured in 1996 dollars. For children and adolescents, I use their parents’
education as the education level since wewant to see whether education helps people obtain better
health service.
The health-related variables we employed in the study includes health insurance variables
(i.e., Having medical insuranceit , Having Medicareit , Having Medicaidit , Drug Insuranceit and
subjective perceived status Perceived healthit). As we all know, besides drug price, the insurance
coverage plays an important role in the patients choice making as well, especially the drug insur-
ance. Therefore, we include dummies for whether having medical insurance, having Medicare,
having Medicaid to control the insurance status for each individual. Unfortunately, the drug in-
surance coverage is not observable in the survey. To proxy the drug insurance, we construct out
of pocket ratioit for each individuals based on their purchasing history.
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The drug attribute variables mainly include Priceit , Age of Moleculeit , Genericit , indication
dummies and side effect variables38. Priceit is deflated to 1996 price level using CPI in Managed
Care Commodities category39. Age of Moleculeit is the same for the branded and generics in the
same year. It is the period length from the birth of new molecule till the year when purchasing
happens. A dummy variable outside is generated to denote whether the individual chooses SSRIs
(outside = 0) or outside option (outside = 1). The variable is introduced to facilitate the estimation
for outside option.
SSRIs are primarily used to treat major depressive disorder (MDD), besides that, they can also
be used to treat obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), panic disorder (PD), post-traumatic stress
disorder (PSD), premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PDD), social anxiety disorder (SAD), bulimia
nervosa (BN). As we can see in Table 13, when a drug is initially developed, its clinical trial data
only supports the safety and efficacy of one or two indications. As time goes by, the manufacturers
carried on subsequent investigation and then more and more indications is supported after the
supplemental approval by FDA. This process is one type of incremental innovation that we want
to investigate in this paper. Therefore, the same drugs across year may have different indications
and therefore bring to the patients different utility, in the following studies, we will control the
year and the indication.
36We define Adultit = 1 if Ageit ≥ 18
37In Prescribed Medicines Files of MEPS, the listed price as well as the price paid by patients are all provided.
38Indication dummies and side effect variables have been introduced in the above data subsection and they are listed
in Table 12 and Table 13.




Figure 1 shows the market share of SSRIs (branded and generics) and an outside option. Just as we
mentioned above, the market share of outside option is around 50 % in our data, including those
who have been diagnosed as depressive but didn’t purchased SSRIs. The overall diagnosed de-
pressive patients are increasing from less than 500 MEPS respondents in 1996 to more than 3500
individuals in 2009. The demand for SSRI antidepressants shifted gradually from the branded to
the generic starting from 2001, the first year when generic Prozac was available. The market share
of generics surpassed that of the branded in 2009. With the expansion of the generics, the patients
who prescribed SSRIs reach the highest level in 2009. However, the total sale of SSRIs changes in
another direction (see Figure 2)40. Although the total demand of SSRIs remains high as shown in
Figure 1, the sales revenue of SSRIs dropped dramatically in 2007, driven by the sharp decreasing
of drug price (See Figure 5). This pattern illustrates that the tough generic competition in this
market make Bertrand-Nash model no longer applicable in the last three or four years.
By separating the market share and sales by brands, it’s clear to see the strategic behavior of
producers (See Figure 3 and 4). For the first five years, the market is mainly divided by three
branded products: Paxil, Prozac and Zoloft. With the entry of Celexa and its new formulation
Lexapro (produced by Forest Labs), the share of Paxil and Prozac begun to shrink in 2003-2005.
The new formulation of Paxil, Paxil CR is not as successful as Lexapro in the market. Lexapro
successfully grabbed market share from its ancestor and other brand competitors, achieving the
highest sales among SSRIs in 2006, while the sales of Paxil CR become negligible until the end.
Another interesting phenomenon about the Celexa and Lexapro is that two or three years before
the patent expiration of Celexa (2004), Lexapro is marketed in 2002. Over that time, the demand
for Celexa gradually shifted to Lexapro. When the generic Celexa entered into market in 2004,
the overall use of Celexa had already gone down significantly, leaving only little market share
for the generic counterparts. This observation is consistent with the evidence of Huckfeldt and
Knittel (2011) [18], who find large decreases in overall use after patent expiration that begin in
the two years before generic entry and continue in the years following. Furthermore, they suggest
that it might be due to advertising which shifts demand from the now cheaper original molecule
to another patented molecule.
The price trend of SSRI antidepressants across the years are provided in Figure 5. The bar
graph indicates the number of generic firms producing the molecule in each year. With the num-
ber of generic entries increasing, both prices for the branded and generics go down, although the
price reduction doesn’t happen immediately after the first generic entry.41 The turning point is
in 2007, when most of the SSRIs prices dropped dramatically. It can be imagined that the pricing
strategies should change afterwards from oligopolistic pricing to perfect competition.
The individual demographic statistics of the sample are provided in Table 3 comparing to the
national representative sample. Column 1 and 2 shows the mean and the standard deviation for
the whole sample in MEPS and the analytic sample in our study; column 3-5 separately show
the statistics of the subjects in the sample by three groups: for those who reported that he/she
has depression but he/she didn’t purchase SSRI drugs; for those who have depression and ever
purchased SSRIs; and for those who have no depression condition but purchased SSRIs.
40The sales is simulated by assuming each individual has a compliance rate of 0.75 over 365 days in a year when
taking the once daily treatment. The price we used is the weighted price over different strengths and dosage forms.
41The Hatch-Waxman Act grants 180-days of market exclusivity to the first generic entry which exclude the generic
competitors in the short run.
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Table 3 reveals that those in the sample are quite distinct from the national population. Com-
pared to the national representative sample, our study sample consists of individuals who are
older ( 45.72 vs. 33.62), more likely to be female, have a lower perceived health status (2.93 vs.
2.21), have a higher prevalence of respiratory diseases (0.09 vs. 0.04), asthma (0.09 vs. 0.05),
hypertension (0.28 vs. 0.13), cardiovascular heart disease (0.19 vs. 0.08), diabetes (0.12 vs. 0.05)
and are, of course, more depressive (0.93 vs. 0.03). Our sample has higher insurance coverage
(0.88 vs. 0.83), lower out of pocket rate (0.48 vs. 0.54), it might be due to the selection effects: in-
dividuals in our analytic sample tend to buy more insurance because of their worse health status.
Our sample have lower household income (39, 610$ vs. 44, 600$) but higher household income
per capita (16, 610$ vs. 15, 330$) which implies that they have fewer dependants in the family.
Overall, it shows considerable variation in most of the demographic variables.
Within our sample, there are also significant differences across the three groups. For those
who reported of having depression, those who chose SSRIs are significantly different from those
who chose an outside option for most of the demographic variables, except for the dummies of
having HIV, having depression (this doesnt make sense to me). For those who purchased SSRIs,
those who are depressive are also distinguished by the all of these variables from sample who are
not depressive except for age, household income per capita, having Medicare, having HIV and
having cardiovascular heart diseases.
Table 5 shows the summary statistics of the drugs. All of the drugs can be used to treat Major
Depressive Disorder.42 A large proportion of the products can be used to treat obsessive compul-
sive disorder (0.68); around half of these products can be used to treat panic disorder (0.55), and
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (0.45). Around one third of the products can be used to treat so-
cial anxiety disorder (0.32) and bulimia nervosa (0.32). Over one-fifth of the products can be used
to treat posttraumatic stress disorder (0.23). The variation of side effects ratios across products
seems not large except abnormal ejaculation and anorexia.
6.2 Demand Side
We estimate the model by simulated maximum likelihood estimation.43 The model contains 109
branded-year fixed effects and 115 explanatory variables (including two random coefficients for
price and generic dummy and 113 individual-drug characteristics interaction terms). The full
set of parameter estimates is shown in Table 15 and Table 16. To avoid poor estimation of Maxi-
mum Likelihood in the existence of scale problem, the variables with large scale have been taken
logarithm. These variables include Age, Age squared, Age of Molecule, Abnormal Ejaculation, Years
of Education.The interaction term of variable outside with individual characteristics from Table
15 shows the estimates for β1r which capture the variations of payoffs of outside option across
individuals.
The selected estimates of parameters for the interacted explanatory variables are listed in Table
6. Factors such as Drug Insurance, Household Income per Capita, Prices, Age of Molecule, Generic
Dummy, Pediatric Usage matter for patients’ choice making. The estimates reveal that several
individual attributes affect price sensitivity. Those with higher incomes, with drug insurance
(lower out of pocket ratio), without Medicaid tend to be less sensitive to price. Age has a U-shape
relationship with price sensitivity: the young and the elderly tend to be more price sensitive
than middle aged adults. In additional to reducing price sensitivity, having drug insurance has a
positive and significant effect on the probability of taking medications (see from the coefficient of
the interaction of Out of Pocket Ratio and Outside Option). Patients with drug insurance tend to
42Due to lack of variation, in the following analysis we will ignore this dummy.
43See Train [29][31] for detailed discussions.
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purchase the youngermedications and generics. The potential explanation for this phenomenon is
that the reimbursement conditions and regulations provided by drug insurers encourage insurees
to purchase generic drugs. As shown in Table 6, patients with medical insurance tend to purchase
drugs with pediatric usage; individuals with higher incomes tend to choose the generics and the
drug with pediatric use.
Using estimates of mean utility derived from the first stage MLE estimation, the second-stage
demand estimation regresses mean utility on price and other product characteristics. The exoge-
nous variables in the second stage are the indication dummies and brand dummy variables with
branded Celexa as the excluded alternative. As shown in Table 12, the dummies of OCD and BN
coincide with brand fixed effects, which generates collinearity problem, and therefore they are
excluded in the second stage estimation. Even if we couldn’t estimate the parameters for these
two indications, it doesn’t affect our future counter-factual calculation. Our focus is the welfare
effect on the discovery of new indications for existing drugs while there is no incremental inno-
vation related to these two indications. Table 7 reports the second-stage results. The first column
shows the results from OLS estimation without consideration of price endogeneity. Column 2-4
shows the IV estimation with different IV combinations. The results show that the coefficient on
Price is negative and highly significant with a coefficient, -1.443. Note that the price coefficient is
much larger than the coefficient on the interaction of Price and Drug Insurance of 0.61 (reported
in Table 6), which implies that those with drug insurance are actually still responsive to market
price. The IVs we used in our main model (column 2) isMarkup*Generic and Number of Dosage the
Product Has.
The relevance and validity of the IV have been checked in our study. Corresponding to the
model specification in Table 7, Table 8 shows the first stage results of regressing price on IVs
and other included exogenous explanatory variables. The results show that the instruments
Markup*Generic and Number of Dosage the Product Has are significantly correlated with prices.
The weak instruments tests have been rejected and the over-identification restriction test shows
that the null hypothesis of the IVs is independent of the error terms are accepted. For the con-
structed IV:years after the first generic entry; and number of firms (branded and generics) selling the
same molecule in the market, they didn’t pass the overidentification test, therefore, we don’t include
them in the table. These two variables are all related to the life cycle of the products, therefore,
they might be correlated with unobserved error term.
6.3 Supply Side
Based on the assumption of firms’ pricing behavior, marginal costs of products in the market are
backed up. For the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the recovered marginal costs satisfy equation 9:
the estimates of marginal costs are built upon the knowledge of observable prices and estimates
of demands and their derivatives. The estimated marginal costs and margins ( Margin = (Price −
MC)/Price.) are shown in Figure 6.
As we expect, based on the Bertrand-Nash model, the estimated firmmargins are much higher
for the years after 2006. Considering that the market structure after 2006 tends to be more com-
petitive, as evidenced by numerous generic entries shown in Figure 5, the margins are overes-
timated. It highlights that our data limitations pose a severe problem in supply side modeling.
Instead of using the estimated cost to recover the counterfactual prices for the years after 2006,
we directly infer the counterfactual prices from the prices in market. This inference might not
be accurate, but it will provide more reasonable estimates of price than those obtained from the
Bertrand-Nash model.
Before computing welfare changes, the simulated equilibrium prices are estimated based on
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the estimated consumer preferences and recovered marginal costs. Products characteristics are
altered in counterfactual scenarios when we withdrawal incremental innovations. Corresponding
to each scenario, there is no pediatric use, new prices, or the newly formulated drugs are removed
from the choice set. Based on the simulated demands and recoveredmarginal costs from the status
quo case, we estimate the equilibrium prices. The correspondence of different cases to different
scenarios and the assumptions of prices and costs for each scenario are illustrated in Table 9 and
10.
The model used to simulate the prices is for Bertrand Nash Oligopolistic market structure. As
we explained before, the Bertrand Nash model tends to overestimate the firm margin when we
could identify the generic competitors. Therefore, to get a tentative estimation of welfare change
for the years after 2006, we simply assume the price equal to the price we observed in the market,
with setting the counterfactual prices without pediatric exclusivity with the price observed one
year later. Because we didn’t have the status quo of price for generic Paxil CR and generic Lexapro,
we have adopted the prices of their ancestors, generic Paxil and generic Celexa.
Figures 7 to 14 show the estimated price changes across scenarios. For example, Figure 13
shows the prices changes from the scenario without pediatric use and pediatric exclusivity to the
scenario with pediatric and without pediatric exclusivity. The pink points denote the prices in
Scenario 7, while the blue points denote the prices in Scenario 8. The prices of Celexa, Lexapro
and Paxil and Paxil CR are slightly lower than the case without pediatric use. Figure 14 shows the
prices changes from the scenario with pediatric use and no exclusivity to the scenario with pedi-
atric use and exclusivity. We find that the exclusivity results in overall price increases (from blue
points to pink points). Not only have the branded firms charged a higher prices to the patients but
so have the generics. Almost all of prices changed from the scenario without market exclusivity to
the scenario with market exclusivity, involve price increases (as shown in Figure 8,10, 12, 14). In
all these figures, we only considered the years before 2006. As we explained before, the standard
Bertrand Nash model couldn’t provide reasonable estimates for the case whenMedicare Part D in-
troduced and there are numerous generic entries. Therefore, the counterfactual estimates doesnt
make much sense.
6.4 Welfare Analysis
As shown in Section 4.4, we measure four counter-factual cases by excluding all the incremen-
tal innovations and accompanied market exclusivities and then excluding three different types
of incremental innovations separately to consider their different effects. To illustrate the mag-
nitude of the benefits and costs side, we need to separate the welfare effect by two parts (see
Equation (11)), which implies we have to investigate 8 different scenarios. For example, for case
4, we construct a counterfactual market withdrawing pediatric use from all drugs, and enabling
the generics enter one year earlier (for Paxil, Prozac, Zoloft4445) (i.e., W (noII ,noME)), together
with a counterfactual including the pediatric use but still making the generics enter earlier (i.e.,
W (II ,noME)). Therefore, we are able to calculate the two effects: W (II ,ME) −W (II ,noME),
W (II ,noME)−W (noII ,noME), noting that the purchasing records observed in data represent the
case W (II ,ME).
As shown in Section 4.5, by dividing individual’s utility change from an event with the price
coefficient, and summing them up, we can obtain the measure of welfare change. The utility
change compares the individual utility from status quo with the utility in counter-factual scenar-
44Celexa didn’t obtain 6-month pediatric exclusivity.
45In our data, we could only identify individual who purchased drugs by years, not months. Therefore, here we can
only measure the effect of generic entry one year earlier if we remove the 6-month market exclusivity.
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ios. Hence, Table 11 and 12 provide the estimates of welfare changes for the years before 2006
and all the years respectively. The profit changes of the firm are for the branded firms. The profit
changes of the generic firms are not listed here for several reasons: first, for the years prior to
2006, the generic market share are very small and the magnitude of welfare effects are ignorable;
second, for the year after 2006 we couldn’t accurately estimate the margin of the generics or their
profits.
Overall, the social benefits from incremental innovation outweigh the loss from market exclu-
sivity by a small margin: 1.2 billion dollars for the years before 2006, and 0.5 billion dollars for
1996-2009 (considering the net value of case 1). Considering the incremental innovation sepa-
rately, the introduction of Lexapro brought large profits to the branded firms, as do the provision
for pediatric use. However, the marketing of Paxil CR with exclusivity brings about net negative
social welfare. For the consumer surplus from each incremental innovation, patients suffer from
”granting exclusivity to incremental innovation;” the net consumer surplus loss from Lexapro is
9.22 billion dollars, from Paxil CR is around 6.29 billion dollars, and from pediatric use is around
6.64 billion dollars for 1996-2005. Due to the overall decrease in drug prices in 2007, the con-
sumer loss for 1996-2009 are reduced for each type of incremental innovation. You might wonder
why putting all the incremental innovation together increase the consumer surplus. As shown in
the column 3 of Table 11 and 12, the consumer surplus of introducing all the incremental inno-
vations is much higher than the sum of benefits from simply introducing one of the incremental
innovations. The reason is that competition effect of multiple incremental innovations drags down
the prices in the market. Compared with Figure 10, 12, 14, the counterfactual prices in Figure 8 is
lower than their counterparts in other three figures. The competition effect also explains why the
loss of branded firm profits is so high in the case of introducing all incremental innovation (20.6
billion dollars in Table 11.)
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I address the following research question: Should additional market exclusivity
be granted to incremental innovations to allow innovators to recoup R&D investment cost from
monopoly pricing, despite the fact that excluding competition could harm the consumer surplus?
By comparing scenarios of either withdrawing or allowing market exclusivity for incremental
innovations with scenarios of withdrawing or retaining incremental innovations, I found that the
consumer benefits from incremental innovation are overwhelmed by the consumer surplus loss
due to market exclusivity when considering a single incremental innovation, whereas the con-
sumer benefits from innovation outweigh the consumer losses from exclusivity when considering
the counterfactual of withdrawal of all incremental innovations and market exclusivities. This
result suggests that innovation benefits are primarily driven not by the quality improvements
of products but by the competition effect of the introduction of several incremental innovation
products in the market.
My research is novel to the literature in the following ways. First, to my knowledge, this is the
first paper to combine a measurement of the value of innovated products with a quantification of
loss frommarket exclusivity, which offers a number of interesting and critical policy implications.
Second, unlike existing studies, which either adopt aggregate level data with random coefficient
models or use individual-level data with conditional logit models to measure the value of phar-
maceutical innovation, my paper applies a random coefficient model with patient-level data. I
estimate the model with simulated maximum likelihood estimation, taking price endogeneity
into account. Although this method brings about difficulties in estimation and is computationally
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burdensome, it takes advantage of detailed demographic information in micro-level data and also
enables individual heterogeneity, resulting in a better fit between model and data. Third, our re-
sults suggest that ”granting market exclusivity” not only provides incentives to innovate but also
fosters a market with improved high-quality products, which hasn’t been emphasized in previous
studies. Although it excludes generic competition, it justifies branded drug competition. There-
fore, taking all these effects into account, ”granting the market exclusivity” is favorable because it
improves social welfare.
However, our results should be interpreted with caution. For starters, our results are drawn
from the incremental innovations of SSRIs antidepressants. For other therapeutic classes of drugs,
the conclusion may not hold. Development of innovative medicines is full of uncertainty, as is
its value to the patients, which varies across diseases and treatments. Additionally, we haven’t
been able to consider the substitution effect of market exclusivity—motivating firms to invest
their resources in incremental innovation results in decreased investment resources in radical
innovation. ”Granting additional market exclusivity to incremental innovations” might alter the
relative marginal revenue of incremental innovation to radical innovation and therefore distort
investment allocation between these two types of innovations. Furthermore, the responsiveness
of incremental innovation to market exclusivity hasn’t been investigated in this paper. We assume
that without market exclusivity, no incremental innovation would be innovated. However, this is
still an open question and it will be explored in our future research.
Several questions worthy of future investigation have arisen. First, how large is the role that
advertising plays in promoting newly formulated drugs, and could we identify the advertising
effects from the improved quality effects in expanding demands for newly formulated drugs?
Second, what are the learning behaviors of patients using pharmaceuticals for chronic diseases,
and how do patterns of switching from one drug to another differ based on different individual
characteristics? Third, will pricing control on the insurer side discourage innovation activities of
the branded firms? As we know, creating drug reference catalogues, legalizing generic substitu-
tions, and setting price caps for brands all tend to encourage consumption of generics instead of
their branded counterparts. These questions are potential directions for future research.
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Table 2: Sample Selection
Conditions No Conditions;
Conditions; No SSRIs Conditions; SSRIs
No Drugs Other drugs SSRIs
No. of Obs. 7, 298 6, 802 10, 901 1, 914
Percentage 27.10% 25.30% 40.50% 7.10%
Total 26, 915
Note: (No)Conditions: The respondents reported that they have (no)
depressive condition. (No) SSRIs: The respondents purchase (no) SSRI
antidepressants. No Drugs: The respondents didn’t purchase any an-
tidepressants. Other Drugs: The respondents purchased other class of
antidepressants.
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Table 3: Individual Demographics
Variables All MEPS Sample Having Having No
sample Employed Conditions Cond.; Cond.;
(96-09) in Study No SSRIs. SSRIs SSRIs
Age 33.62 45.72*** 44.03 47.55*** 47.78
[22.55] [19.04] [19.58] [18.04] [19.47]
Male 0.48 0.32*** 0.36 0.28*** 0.31***
[0.50] [0.47] [0.48] [0.45] [0.46]
Adult (age>18) 0.70 0.92*** 0.9 0.95*** 0.92***
[0.46] [0.27] [0.30] [0.22] [0.27]
Years of Education 9.36 11.75*** 11.43 12.15*** 11.82***
[5.60] [3.64] [3.89] [3.26] [3.62]
Household Income 15.33 16.61*** 15.85 17.36*** 17.85
Per Capita (1996$) [15.36] [16.41] [16.47] [16.37] [15.94]
Household Income 44.6 39.61*** 37.77 40.88*** 46.00***
(1996$) [38.40] [36.61] [36.17] [36.52] [39.26]
Perceived Health 2.21 2.93*** 2.86 3.03*** 2.85***
Status [0.95] [1.04] [1.04] [1.04] [1.05]
Having Medical 0.83 0.88*** 0.85 0.92*** 0.94***
Insurance [0.37] [0.32] [0.36] [0.27] [0.24]
Having Medicare 0.13 0.24*** 0.22 0.26*** 0.27
[0.34] [0.43] [0.42] [0.44] [0.44]
Having Medicaid 0.22 0.25*** 0.26 0.24*** 0.20***
[0.42] [0.43] [0.44] [0.42] [0.40]
Out of Pocket Rate 0.54 0.48*** 0.51 0.43*** 0.46**
[0.27] [0.36] [0.30] [0.41] [0.41]
Having Respiratory 0.04 0.09*** 0.08 0.11*** 0.08***
Diseases [0.20] [0.29] [0.27] [0.31] [0.26]
Having Asthma 0.05 0.09*** 0.08 0.10*** 0.07***
[0.22] [0.29] [0.28] [0.31] [0.26]
Having HIV 0.00 0.00*** 0 0 0
[0.03] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06]
Having Hypertension 0.13 0.28*** 0.26 0.31*** 0.28***
[0.34] [0.45] [0.44] [0.46] [0.45]
Having Cardiovascular 0.08 0.19*** 0.17 0.21*** 0.2
Heart Diseases [0.27] [0.39] [0.38] [0.41] [0.40]
Having Diabetes 0.05 0.12*** 0.11 0.14*** 0.11***
[0.23] [0.33] [0.31] [0.35] [0.32]
Having Depression 0.03 0.93*** 1 1 0
[0.17] [0.26] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 239720 26915 14100 10901 1914
Note: Standard Deviation is enclosed in the bracket. Income is deflated at 1996
dollar level. The t-test significances are shown by stars: Stars in Column 2 compare
Column 1 and 2; Stars in Column 4 compare Column 3 and 4; Stars in Column 5
compare Column 4 and 5. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Manufacturers and Market Share
Products Analytic Sample Survey Sample
Purchasing Obs. Market Share Purchasing Obs. Market Share
CELEXA 966 7.54 7, 588 7.29
LEXAPRO 1, 869 14.58 14, 591 14.01
PAXIL 1, 961 15.3 15, 632 15.01
PAXIL CR 257 2.01 1, 959 1.88
PROZAC 1, 666 13 14, 099 13.54
ZOLOFT 3, 388 26.44 27, 603 26.5
Generic CELEXA 620 4.84 4, 301 4.13
Generic PAXIL 568 4.43 5, 119 4.92
Generic PROZAC 1, 115 8.7 10, 261 9.85
Generic ZOLOFT 405 3.16 2, 990 2.87
Total 12, 815 100 104, 143 100
38
Table 5: Summary Statistics of Product Attributes
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Indications
MDD 1 0 1 1
OCD 0.68 0.48 0 1
PD 0.55 0.51 0 1
PSD 0.23 0.43 0 1
PDD 0.45 0.51 0 1
SAD 0.32 0.48 0 1
BN 0.32 0.48 0 1
Side Effects
Headache 1.16 0.15 1 1.38
Asthenia 1.80 0.57 1 2.82
Nausea 2.46 0.57 1.5 3.51
Diarrhea 1.85 0.34 1.57 2.57
Anorexia 2.20 1.08 1 3.33
Insomnia 1.94 0.33 1.1 2.33
Anxiety 1.53 0.40 1 2
Somnolence 2.61 0.70 1.8 3.84
Rash 1.49 0.57 1 2.6
Abnormal Ejaculation 13.95 10.48 3.42 29.24
Pediatric 0.36 0.49 0 1
Observation 22
Note: MDD=Major Depressive Disorder;
OCD=Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; PD=Panic
Disorder; PSD=Posttraumatic Stress Disorder;
PDD=Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder; SAD=Social
Anxiety Disorder; BN=Bulimia Nervosa; Pediatric=The
safety and efficacy of the drug for pediatric usage have
been established. The values of the side effect variable
are calculated as the ratio of hazard rate of the patients
who take drugs with respect to the hazard rate of the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Estimates of Mean Utility on Prices
OLS IV: Model I IV: Model II IV: Model III
Price 0.388*** -1.443*** -1.680*** -1.304***
(2.81) (-2.96) (-2.94) (-2.76)
Pediatric -0.494* 0.166 0.252 0.116
(-1.87) (0.46) (0.65) (0.33)
Agemole 0.717*** -0.0219 -0.118 0.0341
(2.78) (-0.05) (-0.26) (0.09)
Constant -1.125* 2.794** 3.300** 2.497**
(-1.85) (2.32) (2.41) (2.13)
Brand Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Indication Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Observations 96 96 96 96
R-squared 0.67 0.15 0.00 0.23
Note: 1. Dependent variable is the estimated drug-year mean util-
ity; 2. The IVs used in the Column 2 is markup*generic, num-
ber of dosage; in column 3 is number of dosage; in column 4 is
markup*generic, markup, demand*generic, number of dosage. 5.
The Brand Dummies include Generic Celexa, Generic Paxil, Generic
Prozac, Generic Zoloft, Lexapro, Paxil, Paxil CR, Prozac, Zoloft and
outside option, the excluded one is Celexa. 6. The Indication Dum-
mies include PDD, PSD, SAD, PD. OCD and BN are dropped due to
collinearity problem. 7 . t statistics is included in parentheses. 8.
∗p < 0.1,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 8: The Relevance of IV







No. of Dosage -0.01** -0.02** -0.01**
(-2.58) (-2.92) (-2.55)
Pediatric 0.67*** 0.53*** 0.66***
(3.59) (2.89) (3.56)
Agemole -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.37***
(-2.96) (-2.97) (-2.79)
Constant 2.11*** 2.12*** 2.33***
12.53 12.64 5.23
Brand Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
Indication Yes Yes Yes
Dummies
R squared 0.78 0.77 0.78
96 96 96
Note: 1. Dependent variable is weighted averaged prices
at brand-year level. 2. The Brand Dummies include
Generic Celexa, Generic Paxil, Generic Prozac, Generic
Zoloft, Lexapro, Paxil, Paxil CR, Prozac, Zoloft and out-
side option, the excluded one is Celexa. 3. The Indication
Dummies include PDD, PSD, SAD, PD. OCD and BN are
dropped due to collinearity problem.4. t statistics is in-
cluded in parentheses.5. ∗p < 0.1,∗ ∗ p < 0.05,∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
Table 9: Counterfactual Scenarios
II W (II, no ME) W (no II, no ME)
1. All incremental innovations scenario 2 scenario 1
2. Lexapro as a new formulation of Celexa scenario 4 scenario 3
3. Paxil CR with improved safety scenario 6 scenario 5





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 16: Estimated Brand-year Fixed Effects
Brand Year Coefficients St. Dev.
CELEXA 1999 0.5944 0 ***
CELEXA 2000 0.6875 0 ***
CELEXA 2001 1.1787 126.5858
CELEXA 2002 1.6683 0 ***
CELEXA 2003 1.1544 0 ***
CELEXA 2004 0.8158 0 ***
CELEXA 2005 0.2667 204.5615
CELEXA 2006 0.2525 0 ***
CELEXA 2007 0.0014 39.1229
CELEXA 2008 0.0033 0 ***
CELEXA 2009 -0.5079 46.7675
Generic CELEXA 2004 -1.4079 0 ***
Generic CELEXA 2005 -0.5361 204.5532
Generic CELEXA 2006 0.2513 0 ***
Generic CELEXA 2007 -0.1771 38.9684
Generic CELEXA 2008 0.6432 0 ***
Generic CELEXA 2009 0.8733 46.7913
Generic PAXIL 2003 -2.3003 0 ***
Generic PAXIL 2004 -0.6239 0 ***
Generic PAXIL 2005 -0.2568 204.587
Generic PAXIL 2006 0.1326 0 ***
Generic PAXIL 2007 -0.133 38.4602
Generic PAXIL 2008 -0.2701 0 ***
Generic PAXIL 2009 0.081 46.7616
Generic PROZAC 2001 -0.7943 126.7596
Generic PROZAC 2002 0.3069 0 ***
Generic PROZAC 2003 0.4464 0 ***
Generic PROZAC 2004 0.5114 0 ***
Generic PROZAC 2005 0.3457 204.5877
Generic PROZAC 2006 0.9155 0 ***
Generic PROZAC 2007 0.2055 38.2897
Generic PROZAC 2008 0.4778 0 ***
Generic PROZAC 2009 0.55 46.8321
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Table 15 (Continued)
Generic ZOLOFT 2006 -1.4861 0 ***
Generic ZOLOFT 2007 0.094 38.4213
Generic ZOLOFT 2008 0.1555 0 ***
Generic ZOLOFT 2009 0.9183 46.8527
LEXAPRO 2002 -0.7663 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2003 0.7873 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2004 1.4238 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2005 1.7422 204.629
LEXAPRO 2006 1.9867 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2007 2.2416 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2008 2.3089 0 ***
LEXAPRO 2009 2.2379 0 ***
PAXIL 1996 1.1513 0 ***
PAXIL 1997 0.9485 158.4299
PAXIL 1998 2.3501 0 ***
PAXIL 1999 1.4254 0 ***
PAXIL 2000 1.1311 0 ***
PAXIL 2001 0.9739 126.6269
PAXIL 2002 1.3784 0 ***
PAXIL 2003 1.4426 0 ***
PAXIL 2004 0.7399 0 ***
PAXIL 2005 -0.282 204.6364
PAXIL 2006 0.283 0 ***
PAXIL 2007 -0.298 0 ***
PAXIL 2008 -0.0249 0 ***
PAXIL 2009 -0.5776 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2002 0.2468 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2003 2.155 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2004 2.4827 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2005 1.9279 204.4874
PAXIL CR 2006 2.5338 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2007 1.7259 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2008 0.0901 0 ***
PAXIL CR 2009 0.8844 0 ***
PROZAC 1996 0.9969 0 ***
PROZAC 1997 0.7645 158.4463
PROZAC 1998 2.059 0 ***
PROZAC 1999 0.7415 0 ***
PROZAC 2000 0.7803 0 ***
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Table 15 (Continued)
PROZAC 2001 1.3177 126.7304
PROZAC 2002 1.2438 0 ***
PROZAC 2003 1.1617 0 ***
PROZAC 2004 1.0946 0 ***
PROZAC 2005 1.1955 204.5415
PROZAC 2006 1.0298 0 ***
PROZAC 2007 0.7707 0 ***
PROZAC 2008 1.4179 0 ***
PROZAC 2009 0.1152 0 ***
ZOLOFT 1996 1.6903 0 ***
ZOLOFT 1997 1.5853 158.4378
ZOLOFT 1998 2.6623 3.0816
ZOLOFT 1999 1.163 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2000 1.4136 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2001 1.7355 126.7906
ZOLOFT 2002 1.6021 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2003 1.8479 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2004 2.193 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2005 2.4159 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2006 2.4739 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2007 2.0074 38.575
ZOLOFT 2008 1.4936 0 ***
ZOLOFT 2009 1.3749 46.8219
NO DRUG 1996 0.1615 0 ***
NO DRUG 1997 0.7016 158.468
NO DRUG 1998 2.2866 3.191
NO DRUG 1999 1.0758 0 ***
NO DRUG 2000 0.9876 0 ***
NO DRUG 2001 1.5885 126.723
NO DRUG 2002 2.3198 0 ***
NO DRUG 2003 2.3048 0 ***
NO DRUG 2004 2.7708 0
NO DRUG 2005 3.1811 0 ***
NO DRUG 2006 3.6272 0 ***
NO DRUG 2007 4.5614 38.3853
NO DRUG 2008 4.7049 0 ***












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The individual characteristics are constructed from MEPS Full Year Consolidated files. The Full
Year Consolidated file includes demographic and labormarket information, sample weights, health
status and a rich set of health insurance coverage information. MEPS provides the date of birth
for each respondents which can be used to calculate the Age. Years of Education is collected for
each respondents at the first round of interviews. We generate a Adult dummy for each individ-
ual, Adult = 1 if his/her age is greater than or equal to 18 years old. Family Yearly Income is
summarized over all household members from three components: person’s total income; person’s
refund income; person’s sale income. In MEPS, total person-level income is the sum of all income
components with the exception of person’s refund income and person’s sale income to match as
closely as possible the CPS definition of income; For our purpose, we will sum them up to obtain
the measure of total individual income. By averaging family income within household members,
we obtain Family Income Per Capita. After deflated to 1996 dollars level, we define the income
variable as Log(Family Income Per Capita/1000 + 1) to avoid the scale problem in MLE. In the
survey, respondents are asked the following question during each round: “In general, compared to
other people of the same age, would you say that your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?”
Based on this question, the perceived health status of each respondent are evaluated from 1 (ex-
cellent) to 5 (poor). The variable Perceived Health Status in our study is the mean over rounds.
MEPS constructs a medical insurance variable which summarizes health insurance coverage for
the person in each year. Our medical insurance variable Having Medical Insurance equals to
one if the summarized insurance variable indicates the person has either public or private health
insurance. Whether the individual participates in Medicare or Medicaid or not is provided by
MEPS. All the purchasing observations for SSRI drugs are precisely recorded in MEPS Prescribed
Medicines Component Files. The Prescribed Medicines Component collects information from the
actual pharmacies where survey participants obtain their prescriptions. The information obtained
from pharmacies includes the national drug code and name of the drug, the strength and quantity
obtained, for what condition the drug is prescribed, the total price, as well as the amounts paid
by different insurance sources and the patient. Based on the price information provided by MEPS
Prescribed Medicines Component Files, we can easily construct Out of Pocket Rate by dividing
the price paid by patients with the total price. Most of the individuals have purchasing records
(not restricted to SSRI drugs) in the data which can be used to generate this variable. Less than 10
% of the individuals have no information of Out of Pocket Rate. The mean of Out of Pocket Rate
in that year is utilized for these observations. A large part of the observations in our study are
those who have depression condition. Before we describe the sample construction, the first thing
to know is the depression condition dummy. Condition information is provided inMedical Condi-
tion Files. The condition can be included in MEPS condition roster only for the following reasons:
reported by the household respondent for a particular medical event (hospital stay, outpatient
visit, emergency room visit, home health episode, prescribed medication purchase, or medical
provider visit); reported as the reason for one or more episodes of disability days; or reported by
the household level respondent as a condition ”bothering” the person during the reference period.
We define a respondent as having depression if the ICD-9-CM code equal to one of the following:
296 for episodic mood disorders, 300 for anxiety, dissociative and somatoform disorders, code 311
for depressive disorder not elsewhere classified. By merging the Medical Condition File with Full
Year Consolidated File, we could obtain the sample that has depression. Combining all those who
55
purchased SSRI anti-depressants with those who have depression conditions gives us the analytic
sample.
8.1.2 Drug-level Data
One of the key drug characteristics is price, which we constructed by averaging prices across
strengths and dosage forms by sales weight. All prices have been adjusted to unit level, i.e.,
price per pill; and are deflated to 1996 dollar level by CPI for Managed Care Commodities cat-
egory (Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics). The information about drug characteristics is ob-
tained from package insert labels. At the section of Indications and Usage in labels, indications
of drugs are enumerated. We generate seven indication dummies for each product, including
Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), Panic Disorder (PD),
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PSD), Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PDD), Social Anxiety
Disorder (SAD), and Bulimia Nervosa (BN). Indications of each product are listed in Table 13.
As we see from the table, when a generic drug enters into market, it automatically obtains the
new indication of the branded as long as they are therapeutically equivalent, for example Generic
Prozac 2001 and Prozac 2000. The reason lies in that the branded firm cannot forbid it without
providing new indications within a new strength or a new formulation since physicians could and
would prescribe generics for the new indication of the branded one (as long as they are the same).
If the safety and efficacy of a drug for pediatric use are provided, then we can regard the drug as
having pediatric use. However, the difficulty is that in the label, the safety and efficacy data for
pediatric usage are specific to each indication, for example, the efficacy of ZOLOFT for the treat-
ment of OCD was demonstrated in clinical trials. However, safety and efficacy in the pediatric
population other than pediatric patients with OCD have not been established. If we consider the
pediatric usage for each specific indication will increase the number of dummies several times
which brings about an estimation problem, therefore, here as long as the safety and efficacy data
for one indication have been established, we will regard this drug with Pediatric Use = 1. The
side effects information is obtained from the Adverse Reactions Section in the labels. We choose
the 10 most common symptoms which bother patients most into our data: Headache, Asthenia,
Nausea, Diarrhea, Anorexia, Insomnia, Anxiety, Somnolence, Rash, and Abnormal Ejaculation
(these do not need to be capitalized). For each symptom, the side effect ratio is defined as the
occurrence rate of the patients taking medicine with respect to the occurrence rate of the patients
taking placebo. To illuminating the generating process, the example of Prozac’s label is illustrated
below: As shown in Figure 15, for symptom nausea, the incidence of nausea is: 21 % of 1728Major
Depressive Disorder patients taking Prozac vs. 9% of 975 subjects feeling nausea who have taken
placebo; 26 % of 266 patients taking Prozac to treat OCD felt nausea, while 13 % of 89 OCD pa-
tients taking placebo felt nausea; 29% of 450 Bulimia Nervosa patients taking Prozac vs. 11% of
267 BN patients taking placebo; 12 % of 425 Panic Disorder patients taking Prozac vs. 7 % of 342






Alternative IVs are constructed in the following way: the number of dosages is the count of
strengths and formulations for a molecule produced by one firm is available; years after generic
entry is the period length from the generic entry year till the year when purchasing happened;
the number of firms (branded and generics) selling the same molecule in the market is specific in
each year.
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Figure 15: Part of the Table in Section Adverse Reactions in the label of Prozac
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Chapter 2 The Impact of Venture Capital on Innovation
Roberta Dessı́∗and Nina Yin†
September 25, 2013
1 Introduction
Does venture capital foster productive innovation, and if so, how? Is the impact of venture capital
on innovation very large? These questions are not only of theoretical interest: answering them
correctly is crucial for designing the best public policies on innovation. Although it accounts for
a rather low proportion of total entrepreneurial financing, notably compared to bank finance,1
venture capital is widely regarded as a key factor in the successful performance of the U.S. in terms
of innovation, providing a model that has inspired emulation efforts in many other countries.
From this perspective too, it is important to understand the model and how it works.
This chapter begins by reviewing the empirical evidence on the impact of venture capital on
innovation. We identify some of the key challenges to empirical research in this area and discuss
the methods that have been used to address them. Our review is by no means exhaustive, but
several findings emerge clearly. First, there is evidence of a substantial impact of venture capital
on innovation, measured by patent counts, at the industry level (at least for the United States).
Although estimates vary, on average a dollar of venture capital appears to be three to four times
more potent in stimulating innovation than a dollar of traditional corporate R&D (Lerner 2002).
Second, there is no corresponding evidence of a significant impact of venture capital on innova-
tion at the individual-firm level. We discuss possible explanations for this difference, including
the difficulties of adequately controlling for the endogeneity of venture capital investment at the
firm level. While valid instruments have been found to address the endogeneity problem at the
industry level, this is much harder to achieve at the level of individual firms. Third, there is very
little evidence on how venture capital affects innovation.
Concerning the second finding, the theoretical literature on venture capital has focused pri-
marily on one source of endogeneity: the ex-ante screening hypothesis. The idea is that venture
capitalists have a comparative advantage in evaluating the entrepreneurs who seek funding from
them and selecting the “best” ones. As discussed below, this can bias upwards the estimates of
the impact of venture capital on innovation, since firms with better entrepreneurs (projects) are
more likely to obtain venture funding andmore likely to produce valuable innovations. We argue,
however, that there may be other sources of endogeneity, introducing other biases, possibly going
∗IDEI, Toulouse School of Economics, Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000
Toulouse, France (dessi@cict.fr).
†Tulane University, New Orleans, LA 70118. (nyin@tulane.edu).
1For example, Berger and Udell (1998) find that in the US, 3.59% of small business finance comes from angel
investors, 1.85% from venture capitalists, and 18.75% from commercial banks. More recently, using UK data, Cosh,
Cumming and Hughes (2009) find that 775 out of 952 firms seeking external finance in their sample approached banks,
while only 87 approached venture capital funds and 83 approached private individuals. Moreover, rejection rates were
much higher among venture capital funds (46%) than among banks (17%).
1
in the opposite direction, and making it difficult to draw inferences from reduced-form estimates
obtained with firm-level data.
Concerning the third finding, the theoretical literature has highlighted two main mechanisms
whereby venture capitalists affect the performance of their portfolio firms: monitoring and in-
tervention, on the one hand, which alleviates potential moral hazard problems on the side of the
entrepreneur, and the provision of advice and support on the other hand, which helps perfor-
mance directly.2 Both mechanisms could, in principle, apply to innovation. However, while there
is growing evidence of the role played by venture capitalists in helping to commercialize innova-
tions (Colombo et al. 2006; Gans et al. 2002; Hsu 2006), as well as their role in helping to recruit
key personnel and replace founders with new CEOs (Hellmann and Puri 2002), there is very little
direct evidence showing that they play an important role in fostering innovation.
There is nevertheless evidence from recent work showing that venture capitalists are highly
effective in evaluating the quality of innovations early on, identifying correctly the patent appli-
cations that are likely to succeed and lead to the development of valuable new products. Dessı́
and Yin (2013) build on this observation to develop a theoretical model that highlights some addi-
tional ways, beyond monitoring and advising, in which venture capital may influence innovation.
We present and analyze a highly simplified model based on Dessı́ and Yin to show some of the ef-
fects at work and the implications for innovation. The model also illustrates a potential source of
endogeneity of venture funding that is unrelated to screening. The theoretical analysis therefore
suggests that endogeneity can indeed be an important concern in empirical work. On the positive
side, the analysis yields a number of potentially testable predictions: investigating predictions of
this kind empirically could help to shed new light on the mechanisms whereby venture capital
affects innovation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. We presents a brief overview of the
empirical evidence on the link between venture capital and innovation and introduce a simple
theoretical model, based on Dessı́ (2009) and Dessı́ and Yin (2013). The model is analyzed and
the implications are discussed. We conclude by suggesting potential avenues for future research.
2 Venture capital and innovation: a brief overview of the empirical
evidence
A large and growing empirical literature examines, in different ways, the link between venture
capital and innovation. Our brief overview, summarized in Table 1, is not intended to be ex-
haustive; it only aims to highlight some of the main contributions and implications. Moreover, it
focuses on research that explicitly investigated the impact of venture capital on innovation, rather
than more generally the impact of venture capitalists on the firms they finance.
A key challenge in this line of research has been to establish a causal relationship between
venture capital funding and different measures of innovative performance, such as patent counts.
This issue has been addressed with different methodologies, using data at the industry level and
the individual firm level.
2On monitoring and intervention, see Dessı́ 2005; Holmström and Tirole 1997. On advice and support, see, among
others, Bottazzi et al. 2009; Casamatta 2003; Cestone 2002; Cumming et al. 2005; Dessı́ 2010; Hellmann 1998; Jeng and




The difficulty of establishing causality can be illustrated by reference to the following framework.
Consider innovative performance at the industry level, denoted by PIit , where the subscript i de-
notes the industry and t denotes time. Suppose that this depends on total R&D expenditure in
the industry (Rit), on the ratio of venture capital investment to total R&D expenditure (Vit/Rit),
and on unobserved technological opportunities (uit). This suggests estimating the following re-
gression 3,




to see whether venture capital has a significant impact on innovation; i.e. whether the esti-
mated coefficient c is statistically significant. The difficulty here is that the unobserved technolog-
ical opportunities, captured by the error term uit , are likely to be correlated with the explanatory
variables: if there is a positive technology shock that increases technological opportunities in a
given industry, venture capital investment in that industry is likely to increase, as is total R&D
expenditure. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that they will increase so as to leave the ratio
unaffected. To the extent that the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term, OLS
estimates of their coefficients will be biased.
The problem can be addressed by estimating an instrumental variable regression, provided
appropriate instruments are found. The first paper to do this was Kortum and Lerner (2000).
They cleverly exploit the policy shift that occurred in the United States in the late 1970s, when
the U.S. Department of Labor clarified the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, freeing
pensions to invest in venture capital. This led to a sharp increase in the total funds invested in
venture capital, unrelated to changes in technological opportunities. Thus it could be used as an
instrument in the estimations.
Kortum and Lerner (2000) found that, even after instrumenting, venture capital has a substan-
tial positive impact on innovation, as measured by the patent count at the industry level. Their
results applied to the period 1965-1992. More recently, Ueda and Hirukawa (2008) have repli-
cated these findings with a longer sample period, up to 2001 (i.e. including the period of very
high growth of the U.S. venture capital industry in the late 1990s). They show that venture cap-
ital continued to have a substantial positive impact on industry patent counts during the boom
period of the late 1990s.
Ueda and Hirukawa (2008) then go on to study the impact of venture capital on different mea-
sures of innovative performance, including total factor productivity (TFP) growth. They find that,
in contrast to the results with patent counts, venture capital does not significantly and positively
affect TFP growth. It seems therefore that venture capital funding may be particularly important
for one measure of innovative performance: patenting success.
2.2 Individual firm data
The findings just discussed at the industry level clearly show the need to understand how venture
capital funding may affect innovation. This is also crucial in thinking about implications for
public policy.
However, the empirical evidence on the mechanisms whereby venture funding impacts on in-
novation is limited. Hellmann and Puri (2000) examine a sample of high-technology companies
3See Kortum and Lerner (2000) for the theoretical underpinnings of this specification.
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in Silicon Valley, both venture-funded and non-venture-funded. They classify companies as “in-
novators” or “imitators” based on information about their initial strategy. Innovators are either
creating a new market, or introducing a radical innovation in an existing market, or developing a
technology that will lead to either of the first two outcomes.
Hellmann and Puri (2000) report several interesting results. They find that innovators are
more likely to be financed by venture capitalists. This result could be consistent with different
possibilities though: it may be that venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in fostering
innovation, for example through the provision of valuable advice for example. It may also be that
venture capitalists have a comparative advantage in identifying the most promising innovative
companies.
Hellmann and Puri (2000) also find evidence that venture-backed companies, especially inno-
vators, are faster in bringing their product to market. Again this could be due to helpful advice
by venture capitalists, or to selection of companies with characteristics that are observed by the
venture capitalists but not measured in the available data, which make them more likely to bring
their product to market in a shorter time.
Some of the more recent studies of the relationship between venture funding and innovation
suggest that venture capitalists’ ability to evaluate the quality of innovations (patent applica-
tions) plays an important role, and that venture capitalists may help to foster growth - but not
innovation. Engel and Keilbach (2007) analyze a panel of young German firms. They find that
firms with a higher number of patent applications are more likely to receive venture funding.
Once the firms are venture-funded, they tend to grow more than comparable nonventure firms,
while their innovative performance (in terms of patent applications) does not differ significantly.
Caselli et al. (2009) and Peneder (2010) find a similar result using data on Italian and Austrian
firms, respectively. These studies carefully estimate propensity scores to match venture-funded
firms with otherwise comparable non-venture-funded firms, and thereby minimize the potential
selection bias4. Nevertheless, the problem remains to the extent that venture-backed firms differ
from the non-venture-backed firms they are matched with in terms of unobservable characteris-
tics (observed by the venture capitalists that finance them).
Haeussler et al. (2009) examine data on German and British biotechnology firms. Their results
are consistent with those of the studies just cited: firms with a higher number of patent applica-
tions obtain venture funding sooner. The authors go on to investigate the quality of patents,
measured by received citations, and find that firms with higher patent quality receive venture
funding more quickly. Importantly, the citations occur mostly after the venture capital invest-
ment decision, implying that venture capitalists are highly effective in identifying high-quality
innovations (patent applications). This finding will play an important role in the theoretical anal-
ysis we develop below.
2.3 Is there a link?
Comparing the evidence from studies using firm-level and industry-level data raises a question:
why does venture funding appear to have a positive impact on innovation at the industry level
but not at the firm level? The comparison is obviously fraught with difficulties, since different
studies use different sample sizes and data from different countries and time periods. This is
potentially important given that the venture capital industry has developed quite differently in
different countries.
4The propensity score methodology is also employed by Da Rin and Penas (2007). Their paper attempts to address
directly the question of how venture capital affects innovation by focusing on the determinants of absorptive capacity.
They report that indeed venture capital favors the build-up of absorptive capacity.
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There is also a more fundamental difficulty, as suggested in the discussion above: It is very
hard to address the selection issue in a completely satisfactory way with firm-level data. This
would require an experiment in which start-up firms are randomly assigned to receive venture
funding or funding from other sources; alternatively, it would require the availability of appro-
priate instruments, highly correlated with venture capital investment in the firm but uncorre-
lated with unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics which affect innovative per-
formance.
In the absence of such solutions, can we nevertheless argue that firm-level studies may provide
persuasive evidence against the hypothesis of a positive impact of venture capital on innovation?
Theoretical analysis can shed light on this claim.
In the existing theoretical literature on venture capital, the main hypothesis concerning selec-
tion has been the ex-ante screening hypothesis: Venture capitalists, according to this hypothesis,
are highly effective in evaluating the entrepreneurs that seek funding from them, and selecting
the “better” ones5. Applied to innovation, this hypothesis suggests that venture capitalists will
select and fund the entrepreneurs with the greatest potential for innovative success. Since the
entrepreneur’s potential is not observed by the econometrician, empirical estimates of the impact
of venture funding on innovative performance will tend to be biased upward; intuitively some of
the estimated effect will be due to the entrepreneur’s potential, which makes it more likely that
he will be venture-funded and that he will be successful in innovating.
If we could be sure that estimates will be biased upward, we might be able to make some
inferences concerning the true underlying relationships. However, more recent theoretical work
suggests that, at least in some circumstances, other influences may generate a downward bias. We
investigate this possibility below. If different and opposing biases are present at the same time, the
net effect is not clear. It then becomes difficult to draw inferences from reduced-form estimates
obtained with firm-level data. An alternative but complementary approach might be to exploit
the full power of theoretical analysis and test a richer set of predictions, as suggested at the end
of this chapter.
We can summarize the main findings from our brief overview of the empirical literature as
follows. First, there is evidence of a substantial impact of venture capital on innovation, mea-
sured by patent counts, at the industry level (at least for the United States). Second, there is no
corresponding evidence of a significant impact of venture capital on innovation at the individual-
firm level. One possible reason for this difference is the difficulty of adequately controlling for the
endogeneity of venture capital investment at the firm level. While valid instruments have been
found to address the endogeneity problem at the industry level, this is much harder to achieve at
the level of individual firms. Third, there is very little evidence on how venture capital affects in-
novation. Here theoretical analysis can shed some light, and suggest promising avenues for future
empirical work. In what follows, we focus on this possibility.
3 A simple model
This section introduces a very simple model, based on Dessı́ (2009) and Dessı́ and Yin (2013). The
main purpose of the model is to illustrate some of the ways in which venture capital may affect
innovation.
There are two periods and three dates, t = 0,1,2. At the beginning of the first period (t = 0), an
entrepreneur with an innovative idea seeks funding to invest in turning the idea into a valuable
5See, for example, Brander et al. 2002; Casamatta and Haritchabalet 2006, 2007; and Garmaise 2007; Ueda 2004.
Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) and Lerner (1994) provide evidence of venture capitalists’ ex ante screening role.
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new product or process. At the end of the first period (t = 1), the outcome of this investment
is realized. If the investment is successful in producing a valuable innovation, the entrepreneur
can apply for a patent. At this stage another entrepreneur may enter the industry and invest in a
competing project. During the second period, the patent application succeeds with probability β.
The returns from all projects are realized at the end of the second period (t = 2). Entrepreneurs
possess no capital and need to raise finance from outside investors. For simplicity, there is no
discounting. All agents in the model are assumed to be risk neutral and protected by limited
liability.
3.1 The incumbent
The first entrepreneur, henceforth also called “the incumbent”, requires an initial outlay of value
KI to undertake his project. He succeeds in producing a valuable new product or process at t = 1
with probability α: we can think of this as capturing the quality of the entrepreneur and his idea.
A valuable innovation can be patented with probability β , which depends on the characteristics of
the product. For simplicity, β is assumed to take one of two values, βG or βB, with equal probability
(βG > βB > 0). If the innovation is patented, the incumbent’s project yields verifiable returns R
at t = 2 with probability γ , and 0 otherwise, where R > KI > 0. However, if the innovation is
not patented and a potential competitor has entered the industry, the incumbent’s probability of
success (high returns) is reduced to γ −µ > 0.
For simplicity, we assume that in the absence of an innovation, the incumbent’s returns are
equal to zero.
3.2 The entrant
At t = 1, a second entrepreneur (henceforth also called “the entrant”or “the rival”) may enter the
industry and invest in a competing project. The entrant’s project requires an initial outlay of value
KE . It succeeds with probability ρ, unless the incumbent obtains a patent for his innovation: in
this case the entrant’s probability of success is reduced to zero. Success yields returns Y while
failure yields zero; Y > KE > 0.
3.3 Investors
Entrepreneurs may seek financing from a venture capitalist or from other investors. A venture
capitalist who funds the incumbent, and interacts closely with him during the first period is as-
sumed to possess enough information, expertise and industry-specific knowledge to be able to
evaluate the probability that a patent application by the incumbent will be successful. Other ven-
ture capitalists, who have not been involved in the development of the innovation during the first
period, will not have sufficient information, and will not be able to evaluate this probability cor-
rectly. Nor will other investors, even if they have funded the incumbent at the beginning, because
they will not possess the necessary industry-specific knowledge and expertise.
To focus on the implications of this informational difference, we abstract from other differ-
ences between venture capitalists and other investors, and assume that they are all competitive.
3.4 Information
Our key informational assumption, as mentioned above, is that the realization of β at t = 1 is only
observed by the venture capitalist that has funded the incumbent (if external finance is raised
from a venture capitalist). The idea is that firm “insiders” possess an informational advantage
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concerning the innovation, which is not fully disclosed in the patent application; moreover ven-
ture capitalists have greater expertise and industry-specific knowledge enabling them to assess
the likelihood that an innovation will be granted a patent.
This assumption is consistent with the findings by Haeussler et al. (2009), discussed earlier,
showing that venture capitalists are highly effective in identifying high-quality patent applica-
tions.
3.5 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions throughout the analysis:
1
2 [(1− βG) + (1− βB)]ρY < KE (A1)
This implies that in the absence of any information concerning the realization of β, the ex-
pected return from funding the entrant, is negative once the incumbent applies for patent protec-
tion for his innovation.
(1− βB)ρY > KE > (1− βG)ρY (A2)
The entrant’s expected profits are strictly positive when the probability of a patent being
granted to the incumbent is low, and strictly negative when the probability of a patent being
granted to the incumbent is high.
3.6 Time line
See Figure 1.
4 External finance raised from investors
We begin by examining the case where the incumbent obtains external finance to undertake his
project from investors who will not observe the realization of β at the intermediate stage (t =
1). These may be ”arm’s length” investors, who do not interact closely with the entrepreneur
while he tries to develop his innovative idea into a valuable new product or process. They may
also be investors who do interact repeatedly with the entrepreneur and are involved in a number
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of strategic decisions in the course of this relationship, but who do not have the expertise and
industry-specific knowledge required to accurately assess the probability that the new product or
process will be granted a patent.
In this case there is essentially symmetric information about β between the ”insider” investors
and other, outside investors. In particular none of them observes the realization of β at the inter-
mediate stage.
By assumption (A1), nobody will be willing to fund the entrant once the incumbent has ap-
plied for a patent. Outside investors will be willing to fund the entrant, on the other hand, if
the incumbent does not apply for a patent, since ρY > (1 − βB)ρY > KE . The entrepreneur will
therefore apply for a patent when he develops a new product or process, and this will deter entry.
Ex ante, the incumbent’s expected return from his project is given simply by:
UN = αγR−KI (2)
5 External finance raised from a venture capitalist
In this section we assume that the incumbent obtains the required initial funding for his project
from a venture capitalist, who will interact closely with the incumbent during the first period, and
have sufficient information as well as the necessary expertise and industry-specific knowledge to
assess the probability that the incumbent’s patent application will be successful.
At the intermediate stage (t = 1), we now have asymmetric information between the venture
capitalist who has funded the incumbent and other investors: the former observes the realization
of β, while the latter do not.
From assumption (A1), as before, we know that in the absence of any information concerning
the realization of β, investors will not be willing to fund the entrant once the incumbent has
applied for a patent. Moreover, the incumbent is better off applying for a patent when he develops
a new product, because in the absence of a patent application investors will always finance the
entrant.
The difference with the previous section is that the venture capitalist who has funded the
incumbent now observes the realization of β. When β is low (βB), the venture capitalist may
be willing to fund the entrant. We assume for simplicity that in this case the venture capitalist
would extract all the surplus from the transaction, since the entrant could not obtain funding from
another source. Denote the surplus by S ≡ (1 − βB)ρY −KE . To ensure that the venture capitalist
funds the entrant only when this is efficient, the venture capitalist can be given a claim to the final
returns from the incumbent’s project (i.e. R), in return for a transfer T to the incumbent. This
means that the venture capitalist fully internalizes the costs for the incumbent’s project when he
decides whether to fund the entrant. The venture capitalist will then finance the entrant if, and
only if, the following condition holds:
S > (1− βB)µR. (C1)
Ex ante, the incumbent’s expected return from his project is now given by:
UVC = αmax[γR,γR+ S − (1− βB)µR]−KI (3)
which will be higher than the expected return when financing is raised from other investors if
condition (C1) holds.
We can define the threshold value α∗VC as the value of α for which UVC = 0, and the threshold
value α∗N as the value of α for which UN = 0. These are the threshold values for α below which
entrepreneurs will not be able to obtain funding for their projects from venture capitalists and
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from other investors, respectively. Clearly if condition (C1) holds, α∗VC < α
∗




6 Theory and evidence
In spite of being highly simplified and stylized, the model analyzed above already yields some
insights6.
As we have just seen, venture capitalists, after funding an entrepreneur with an innovative
idea, may be able to extract surplus from potential entrants at a subsequent stage, exploiting the
informational advantage gained through close interaction with the first entrepreneur. Ex ante,
this can make it possible to obtain funding for innovative projects that would not be financed by
other investors: in the model, this will be the case if UVC > 0 > UN .
There are then two effects on innovation: a direct effect on the number of innovative projects
that are undertaken, and an indirect effect on the average quality of funded projects. The first
effect is obviously positive; it is analogous to the effect of monitoring by venture capitalists (as in,
for example, Holmström and Tirole (1997)), in the sense that it relaxes firms’ financing constraint,
albeit for a quite different reason.
The second effect can be seen by noting that α∗VC < α
∗
N . Thus, ceteris paribus, the average
quality of projects, as measured by the probability of innovation α, will be lower among venture-
backed entrepreneurs than among those funded by other investors. Obviously this effect is due
to the assumption that α is perfectly observed by venture capitalists and other investors alike.
Nevertheless, it illustrates in a simple way the point made earlier, that the endogeneity of venture
capital funding can be due to a variety of reasons (not just the screening hypothesis), and the
nature of the resulting bias in empirical estimates cannot be predicted with confidence.
The model analyzed in the previous section is very simple in many respects, and further in-
sights can be gained by relaxing some of the assumptions. For example, the probability of develop-
ing a valuable new product is assumed to be exogenous: it does not depend on the entrepreneur’s
effort. One consequence of this is that the projects that are funded when UVC > 0 > UN would not
be worth funding without the possibility of extracting surplus from potential entrants. However,
once the model is extended to allow for the need to induce the entrepreneur to provide effort, it
will typically be the case that the entrepreneur will earn some rents, reducing the returns that
can be earned by outside investors, so that some projects that would be worth funding cannot
obtain outside financing. In this case, the venture capitalist’s ability to extract surplus (informa-
tional rents) from potential entrants may make it possible to undertake projects that would be
profitable even on a stand-alone basis, but would be denied funding (Dessı́ (2009)).
Moreover, and for the same reason, venture funding may make it possible to give more high-
powered incentives to the entrepreneur (since the expected surplus from new entrants relaxes the
venture capitalist’s participation constraint), increasing his effort (Dessı́ (2009)), and hence the
probability of developing a valuable new product or process.
7 Conclusions
The existing empirical literature has shown considerable ingenuity in addressing the challenges
of establishing and quantifying a causal relationship between venture capital and innovation. Yet
there remains plenty of room for further work shedding light on the precise mechanisms through
which venture capital fosters innovation. In this chapter we have argued, using a simple model
6For a richer model and analysis, see Dessı́ and Yin (2013).
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to illustrate our point, that a close interaction between theoretical and empirical analysis offers
a promising avenue for future research. For example, our model suggests that the link between
venture funding and innovative performance at the level of the individual firm may depend on
the potential for surplus extraction from other firms, and hence on industry characteristics and
structure. It would be interesting to explore this empirically in future work.
The theoretical analysis could be extended in a number of directions: for example, allowing
for exit decisions. The allocation of control rights has been shown to be important for exit deci-
sions (Cumming (2008), Dessı́ (2005), Hellmann (2006)), and the design of optimal contracts for
innovative entrepreneurs in the presence of exit decisions as well as potential entry by competing
firms deserves further study. Empirically much work also remains to be done to investigate the
relationship between the form of contracts used by venture capitalists (e.g. control rights, staging,
syndication) and innovation.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the limitations of the simple analysis presented in this chap-
ter. For example, we have focused primarily on the role of private, limited partnership venture
capital funds, with no strategic or public interest in innovation per se. The role of corporate and
government venture capital has been studied elsewhere (see Gompers and Lerner (2004)), and
represents an important part of the link between venture capital and innovation.
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Chapter 3 Intellectual Property and Cumulative Innovation
Margaret Kyle∗and Nina Yin†
September 25, 2013
1 Introduction
Economists generally accept that intellectual property rights may promote innovation, but may
also impede subsequent research. Patents, in particular, allow innovators to appropriate returns
by blocking others from using their ideas. If research is cumulative, patents potentially prevent
scientists from “standing on the shoulders of giants” to build on prior work. Theoretical work
includes Bessen and Maskin [2009], who illustrates that patents may not be efficient when in-
novation is sequential and complementary; and Heller and Eisenberg [1998], who suggest the
possibility of a scientific “anticommons” when too many patentholders use their property rights
to exclude others. Recent empirical work confirms the validity of these concerns (Murray and
Stern [2007], Williams [2013], and Galasso and Schankerman [2013]). The explosion of patent ac-
tivity, including by universities (Schacht [2009]), suggests that the negative consequences of IPRs
on cumulative innovation may grow in importance.
Patent policy in many countries addresses the possible impediments by exempting some re-
search from infringement concerns. These exemptions take different forms (statutory vs. case law)
and apply to different types of organizations or research. For example, most European countries
restrict the use of patents to block research for noncommercial purposes. In the United States, no
such statutory exemption exists. However, the US and other countries allow generic drug firms
to use patented materials to prepare applications for regulatory approval. There is little empiri-
cal work on the use and importance of these exemptions. Survey evidence in Walsh et al. [2007]
suggests that academic scientists are unaware of or insensitive to their potential infringement,
although those working in biomedical fields report more issues related to intellectual property
rights.
We investigate the potential effects of intellectual property and research exemptions on cumu-
lative innovation in drug development. Cumulative innovation in this context may be finding new
∗Toulouse School of Economics, IDEI and CEPR (margaret.kyle@tse-fr.eu)
†Tulane University (nyin@tulane.edu). We are grateful to Tahir Amin and Intan Hamdan-Livramento for their help
on patent law and their valuable comments and suggestions. We thank Pfizer for access to the IMS Patent Focus data
used. The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors, and we are responsible for all errors.
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uses for existing treatments, or using existing treatments to establish the benefits of a new com-
pound. In the absence of a license from the patentholder, use of a patented drug in experiments
may constitute infringement. The cost of obtaining a license and the risk of litigation increase the
costs of cumulative innovation and may impede follow-on work.
Patent protection at the drug level varies over time and across countries; policies such as patent
terms, patent exhaustion and research exemptions also vary across time and countries. We exploit
this variation to identify the effect of patents on cumulative innovation. If research can be cost-
lessly relocated, the total effect of patent rights on cumulative innovation may be insignificant;
however, patents may be an important determinant of where research occurs, and therefore still
of interest for local policy. If relocation of research is difficult, then the policies of countries with
higher innovative capacities may have global importance.
We use new clinical trials as a measure of innovative effort. Data come from the major clinical
trial registries around the world, including those of the US, the European Union, Japan, China,
India, and others. We combine this with patent information at the drug and country level. Due to
variation of statutory provisions about research exemption across countries, our study is capable
of investigating the effect of research exemption and how it interacts with patent protection. As
the vast list of countries provide idiosyncratic political and economical environments that might
promote or hurdle innovation, we propose to utilize the innovative capacity index of countries
to capture the competitiveness in research across countries. We also distinguish the innovative
efforts that conducted before the drug launch and after as the marketed drug facilitates the exper-
iments even under patent protection. Our results show that the overall effect of patent protection
tends to promote the innovative activities; post launch drugs facilitate the clinical trial conducted
on them. Research exemption turns out to be associated with lower level of follow-on innovation
activities. Clinical trials tend to conducted in higher ICI countries and the ICI index promotes
more innovative activities in patent protection and post launch case.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the background of drug
development and IP law; Section 3 discusses the literature and theoretical motivation; Section
4 describes the data employed; Section 5 develops the empirical framework and predictions of
hypothesis; Section 6 presents the summary statistics and empirical findings. We conclude in
Section 7 by discussing the broader implications for science and IP policy.
2 Theoretical motivation
Of particular interest in recent years is the relationship between intellectual property and cu-
mulative innovation. The choice of patent breadth, for example, is impossible to assess without
also considering the treatment of cooperation between firms and collusive licensing (Scotchmer
[1991]). Shapiro [2000] and others highlight the potential costs associated with fragmented IP
rights, or patent thickets, for follow-on innovation. A license may be required from many dif-
ferent IP owners, who may be difficult to find and who fail to account for the effect of their own
license prices on demand for others. Heller and Eisenberg [1998] asks whether there is an anti-
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commons in biomedical research. They note that the inefficiency is greatest when patent rights to
fundamental innovations are fragmented.
Empirical work on patent law and cumulative innovation is limited, and has focused primarily
on the possibility of an anticommons. In discussing results from a survey of academic scientists,
Walsh et al. [2007] are generally skeptical of the idea of a research anticommons: scientists did not
report that IP hindered their work. However, drugs were an important exception. Researchers’
requests for drugs to use in their work were less likely to be fulfilled, especially from industry.
Drugs were also seen as more limited by patents than other inputs to research. In contrast, Hansen
et al. [2005] report that 40% of the scientists responding to a different survey said that difficulties
in obtaining permission to use patented materials had adversely affected their work.
Several recent papers suggest that there is some cause for worry about the negative effects
of patent protection and cumulative innovation. Murray and Stern [2007] study “patent-paper”
pairs, in which the same idea diffuses under two different IP regimes. They find that following
a patent grant, citations in the scientific literatire to an idea modestly lower than to comparable
ideas. Williams [2013] compares genes with and without IP during a 2 year period, and finds
that scientists used the genes protected by patents less than those without. Like Murray and Stern
[2007], she measures use with citations in scientific papers, as well as the development of a genetic
test that uses the gene; she also finds significant effects of IP on the use of patented materials.
Galasso and Schankerman [2013] apply a different empirical approach and examine a broader set
of industries. They examine citations to a patent before and after its invalidation, using a clever
instrumental variable derived from the random assignment of judges to patent cases. Their study
shows interesting heterogeneity across technologies/industries: the effect of invalidation is largest
in computers, electronics, and medical technology.
Most work in this area, in legal scholarship as well as in the economics literature, has focused
on the United States. This reflects the importance of patent activity (and litigation), which has
grown substantially over the last several decades. The definition of patentable subject matter is
broader in the US than in many other countries, currently encompassing aspects of genetics, re-
search tools, software, and business methods. With multilateral and bilateral trade agreements
that include amendments to patent laws, the discussion of these issues now extends to other
places, especially emerging markets. The most notable of the multilateral agreements is that
adopted in 1994, when the World Trade Organization was established. The Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement requires WTO members to grant patents
of at least 20 years, including on pharmaceutical products. But the TRIPS Agreement also allows
a number of exceptions to rights conferred by intellectual property, partly in response to con-
cerns raised by developing countries; compulsory licensing of patents, for example, is permitted
under some circumstances. Individual countries may include these exceptions without violating
the TRIPS Agreement, but are not obligated to do so, and there is variation in their use across
countries.
In this paper, we focus on exceptions for the use of patented material in “acts done for ex-
perimental purposes” or “acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes,” or a research
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exception more generally. In general, patent law allows the owner of patents to prevent the use of
their inventions by unauthorized third parties. These exceptions stem from the view that innova-
tors should be rewarded with monopoly power over commercial activity, but that patents should
allow innovators to should not provide a monopoly over non-commercial activity. In particular,
it has long been held that patent rights should not restrict scientific research. However, consid-
erable debate exists both between and within countries over the definition of “non-commercial”
or “experimental” use. Should experimentation for the purpose of designing around a patent be
exempted from infringement? Should such experimentation be exempted only when there is no
commercial aspect? Distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial use is not always
straightforward. In some countries, the activities of non-profit organizations or state institutions
considered non-commercial.
Of particular relevance to pharmaceutical research is the so-called “Bolar” exception1 used
by many countries, including the US. This exception allows generic firms to conduct research on
a molecule still under patent protection if that research is conducted for purposes of winning
regulatory approval following the patent’s expiration. However, this exception is less important
for cumulative product innovation, since generic drug firms using the Bolar exception are usually
manufacturing a version that is as close as possible to the originator’s product.
Unlike many other countries, the US has no statutory exception for research or experimental
use. Case law in the US has established an experimental use exception, but also taken a broad
view of commercial activity. In the well-known Madey vs. Duke case, the Court of Appeals of
the Federal Circuit noted that university research often has commercial elements, and does not
necessarily qualify for the experimental use exception. Following recent court decisions in the US,
DeFranco [2006] states “[i]t is clear that under most practical circumstances neither industrial
nor academic researchers can successfully invoke the experimental use exception to charges of
patent infringement. Instead, the exception remains unavailable for uses of patented inventions
in pursuit of any business interests, including both design-around attempts and at least some
uses in a university research setting.” However, US courts have taken a broad view of the Bolar
exception (as in the Merck KGaA v Integra Lifesciences I Limited decision), permitting the use of
a patented drug in clinical research without infringement if the research might ultimately result
in data relevant for regulatory approval.
As noted by Dent et al. [2006], there is only limited evidence on the importance of patents
and the research exception for cumulative innovation, despite its relevance in current policy dis-
cussions. As the US negotiates “TRIPS-plus” trade agreements with partners in the developing
world, conformity with US-style IP laws is likely to increase. Some developed countries have
also recently made adjustments to their research exceptions. In early 2013, for exmaple, the UK
changed its patent law to expand the research exception to clinical trials, and the Minister for
1So named because of Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), in which the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the experimental use exception did not extend to the activities
of generic drug firms. Soon after, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act changed the law to permit generic firms to conduct
research prior to patent expiration.
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Universities and Science David Willetts said this “marks an important step forward by removing
the risks of patent infringement when testing new drugs and treatments. This will make the UK
a more attractive location for research and development, supporting growth and innovation.”2
Overall, we expect a patent on a drug to raise the costs of research for non-originators, and con-
sequently for fewer clinical trials to be conducted on that drug in countries where it is patented.
Thismay bemoderated by the presence of a research exception for researchers in the non-commercial
sector (particularly academic and non-governmental organizations). In addition, both patents
and a research exception are likely to be more important in countries with high innovative capac-
ities; conversely, patents are probably not the more important impediment to cumulative research
efforts in countries with low innovative capacity. A product patent on a drug may also affect
the nature of cumulative research efforts by non-originators. Discovery of a new use would be
commercially valuable only with permission to produce from the holder of a product patent, for
example.
At the same time, there are many reasons to expect that patents have only a small effect, if any,
on cumulative innovation in pharmaceuticals. Galasso and Schankerman [2013] find that patents
had no statistically significant effect on citations in some sectors, including drugs. Licensing is
widespread in pharmaceuticals, which suggests that transaction costs in contracting may not pose
a large barrier to cumulative innovation. So-called patent thickets, where a large number of patent
owners hold overlapping IP rights, are more typical in other sectors such as semiconductors. In
addition, academic researchers may be unaware of IP barriers, or may see the risk of litigation as
too low to affect their behavior (Walsh et al. [2007]). Even if they are sensitive to infringement
concerns, it may be possible for researchers to shift the location of their activities to countries
where IP barriers are lower instead of (or in addition to) adjusting the level of those activities
in response to intellectual property policies. For example, DeRouen et al. [2012] find that US
policies limiting stem cell research are associated with a reduction in the output of US-based
scientists relative to those located outside the US. The total welfare effect depends on whether the
decline in US research was fully offset by an increase elsewhere. In addition to shifting research
across space, researchers may shift across time: they may simply wait for key patents to expire.
The welfare effects of any delay are also difficult to assess.
3 Description of drug development and IP law
In order to win regulatory approval for sale, innovators must demonstrate the safety and effi-
cacy of a new drug for a specific use through evidence from human clinical trials. These trials
often take years to complete, are expensive, and have high failure rates.3 Because imitation of
drug is relatively easy once its quality has been established, patents play a more important role
in the pharmaceutical sector than in most others (Cohen et al. [2000]). It is generally (though
not universally) agreed that patent protection for pharmaceuticals induces more innovative ef-
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cutting-of-red-tape-to-benefit-research-and-d evelopment-of-new-drugs
3For an overview of the process, see the FDA website.
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fort, though the elasticity of R&D with respect to patent protection varies by country (Kyle and
McGahan [2012]).
The number of patents granted to a drug depends on several factors. First, the drug’s origina-
tor may apply for a product patent on themolecule itself; this is usually considered the “strongest”
patent in that it is difficult for others to invent around it. While most countries are now required
to grant product patents on pharmaceuticals, many changed their patent laws after 1995 in order
to comply with the TRIPS Agreement.4 Often, innovators apply for subsequent patents covering
new uses of the molecule, manufacturing processes, or similar chemical forms such as salts or iso-
mers. Patent offices in different countries may use different criteria in determining the eligibility
for protection, which results in varying degrees of IP for the same drug across countries. These
follow-on patents may come years after the initial product patent, so the number of patents on a
drug within a country also varies over time.
Cumulative innovation in pharmaceuticals can take several forms. These include process inno-
vations, such as refinements to manufacturing or compounding that lower the cost of production.
In this paper, we focus on cumulative product innovations. For example, new uses for a drug
can be found, and sometimes patented. Decades after its discovery as a pain reliever, aspirin was
shown to have value as a preventative treatment for heart attacks. More recently, a new use (grow-
ing thicker eyelashes) for the glaucoma treatment bimatoprost was discovered. Additional uses
for the cancer drug Avastin are currently being explored. Other incremental innovations include
the development of better dosing formulations, such as extended-release pills or pediatric liquids
that improve compliance. Finally, existing pharmaceuticals are often the comparator treatments
in clinical trials of other molecules. That is, they are an input in the research conducted in the
development of other treatments.
“Inventing around” a patent might also be considered a form of cumulative innovation. Par-
ticularly when no product patent exists (but other types of patents do), imitators may find ways
to produce the same molecule without infringement. In many countries, including the US, an
abbreviated approval process exists for generic drugs. Rather than requiring the same long and
expensive clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy again, regulators allow generic firms
to reference that data and submit less onerous testing to demonstrate bioequivalence.5 Such tests
still take some time and potentially delay generic entry.
For drugs already on the market, patentholders may not be able to control how the product
is used in research if the first sale doctrine applies. Once the product has been sold, intellectual
property rights may be considered exhausted, and researchers able to purchase the drug for use in
their studies through standard channels. In this scenario, investigators may face high acquisition
cost of the patented materials due to monopoly pricing, but do not require a license. In our empir-
ical analysis, we distinguish between research performed prior to a drug’s launch and that done
4Countries that are members of the World Trade Organization must comply with the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement, which includes a number of requirements for pharmaceutical patents. Least-
developed countries have a 2016 deadline for compliance.
5However, in many countries the firm that conducted the initial trials that generic applications reference enjoys a
period of data exclusivity, during which no other firm may rely on that data; see Liu and LaCroix [2013].
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afterwards. Prior to launch, the research exception may be relevant, because the only means of
obtaining the material would be to manufacture it (normally an act of infringement) or to request
it directly from the patentholder. After launch, the research exemption may not be necessary.
The existence of patent protection has implications for the extent and location of cumulative
innovation activity. As discussed above, patent law can influence the incentive to develop a new
use for a molecule as well as the cost of incremental or follow-on work performed by firms other
than the patentholder. Since we are looking at patents on molecules rather than on genes or
research tools, an anticommons that stems fragmentation of patent rights may be less of a concern.
Without a research exception, cumulative innovation on a patented drug must be undertaken by
the owner of the patent or those with a license from the patentholder. The cost of obtaining
patented materials or permission to use themmay be nontrivial, even when no “thicket” of patent
rights exists.
The research exception adopted by many countries specifically recognizes the benefits associ-
ated with the use of patented materials in subsequent research. With a research exception that
applies only to noncommercial activities, academic or government scientists may attempt cumu-
lative innovation, but commercial firms may not do so without permission. The specific imple-
mentation of experimental or research use exceptions and the scope of activities that are defined
as noncommercial may affect the share of cumulative research performed in the academic or pub-
lic sector. Even when the research exception is narrow or does not exist, the cost of enforcement
may shield academic researchers from lawsuits by patentholders.
We study three types of exemption in the regression: experimental exemption, non-commercial
exemption, and Bolar exemption. The exemption dummies are recorded as one if and only if
the countries have a statutory exemption. (We are refining this to include case law exemp-
tions.) An experimental/non-commercial exemption states that any use of the compound in
experiments/non-commercial research is exempt from infringement. The Bolar exemption as-
sures that all use of compound that are reasonably related to submission of information to the
government under any law regulating the manufacture, use or distribution of drugs.
This paper examines the extent to which either IP protection or the research exception matter
for cumulative innovation involving pharmaceuticals. We exploit variation in the extent of IP
protection on a specific drug across countries, and within countries over time, to test whether
patents are associated with lower levels of research activities directed at cumulative innovation.
We test also whether the effect of patents on cumulative innovation is lower in the presence of a
research exception, and whether the effects of patent protection and the research exception vary
with a country’s level of innovation. Finally, since research exemptions and incentives to litigate
vary across organization types, we explore differences between research activity conducted by
patentholders, for-profit competitors, and the public and academic sector.
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4 Methods
Our theoretical motivation suggests that the level of follow-on research depends not only on the
proprietary rights of the experimental products but also on any statutory research exception. To
test this idea, we examine how the number of clinical trials is related to the patent status of
each drug, which varies across countries and time, and the research exception provisions in each
country, which varies across countries and on the types of organizations to which they apply.
4.1 Identification
Ideally, to test the effect of a patent on subsequent clinical trials, we would randomly assign
patents to drugs and research exceptions to countries. In practice, this is of course infeasible.
Instead, we exploit variation in patent laws across countries and variation over time and across
countries in the patent status of a drug, and employ a differences-in-differences (DID) approach.
Essentially, we want to compare the use of patented knowledge (or a drug) with use of unpatented
drugs in clinical trials. Obviously, patented drugs are likely to be systematically different from
unpatented drugs, and this simple comparison will yield a biased estimate of the effect of a patent.
However, we are able to compare the same drug in environments with patent protection to envi-
ronments without patent protection. In general, this comparison will also be biased due if we fail
to account for differences between those environments.
The validity of DID depends on the conditional independence assumption (CIA). That is, con-
ditional on the controls we include, there is no systematic difference in research effort across
countries, drugs and years for which patent protection is and isn’t in effect. Section 5 provides a
detailed explanation of the control variables used. We believe these are sufficient for CIA to hold
for the following reasons.
Aside from the intellectual property environment, an investigator’s decision to initiate a trial
and where to do so depends on several other considerations. Some countries may be more attrac-
tive locations for research because of the quality of their science base is high. The importance of a
country as a potential market for future products may also play a role, as clinical trials may serve
as a form of advertising. The prevalence of the disease of interest is also salient, since it affects the
costs of enrolling trial subjects. The number of trials may vary over time in response to disease
shocks (a flu pandemic, for example) or following the development of new research tools.
We control for these factors by including country, drug and year fixed effects in our analy-
sis. While patent policies are not randomly assigned across countries, we argue that first, most
developed countries did not make large changes to their patent laws during our sample period
(2002-2012). Developing countries have generally increased patent protection, but these changes
were largely forced upon them by the TRIPS Agreement.6 Usually, if inventors want protection in
multiple countries, they must apply within 24 months of their first application. However, there
is some variation in patent expiration dates across countries associated with differences in patent
6See Hamdan-Livramento [2009] and Kyle and McGahan [2012].
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term extensions. Our primary worry is the existence of an omitted variable that drives both adop-
tion of particular patent policies as well as the location of clinical trials, which is why we include
a measure of a country’s innovative capacity. At the drug level, molecules with many patents are
likely to be systematically different from those with very few: originators invest in obtaining more
patents for more valuable drugs. However, by including drug fixed effects, we are able to sweep
out these differences in quality or value.
Our empirical approach is similar in many ways to those adopted by Murray and Stern [2007],
Williams [2013] and Galasso and Schankerman [2013]. These papers examine how the addition or
subtraction of patent rights changes citations (in other patents, or in scientific papers) to an idea;
that is, they rely on within-idea changes in IP status over time. We use an additional source of
variation in patent rights, that across countries. We also employ an outcome measure appropriate
for the specific context of our study, that of pharmaceutical innovation.
4.2 Empirical model
Before the comprehensive analysis, we will first have a look at a baseline model by considering
the response of the global trials to the patent status in the US and other countries. To be specific,
the model is expressed in this form:
No. of T rialsit = α
+ β1Any product patent in the USit
+ β2No. of other country with product patentsit
+ β3Prior to drug
′s global launchit
+ β4Prelaunchit ∗Any product patent in the USit
+ β5Prelaunchit ∗No. of other country with product patentsit
+ γ1Drug Ageit +γ2Drug Age
2
it
+ γ3Years since f irst patent applicationit
+ Year FE +Drug FE + ǫit ,
The unit of observation in this model is at drug-year level. We are curious about how global
innovation activities that conducted on each drug in each year varies with the drug’s product
patent status in the US and other countries, with the timing of drug launch and other controls
(drug age, years after patent application, etc.).
Here, our dependent variable No. of T rialsit measures the total number of interventional
trials conducted globally on the drug i in year t. The explanatory variables include,
• Any product patent in the USit , equals to one if there is any product patent for the drug i in
the US in year t;
• No. of other country with product patentsit , denotes the number of countries except the US
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that have product patent on drug i in year t;
• Prior to drug ′s global launchit , equals to one if drug i hasn’t been launched globally yet at
year t;
• Interaction terms among the above three variables.
Besides the explanatory variables, we also control the Drugageit , and Years since f irst patent
applicationit , which is the number of year since the drug’s first patent application has been filed.
After get a flavor of this question, we then turned to a more delicate model below:
No. of T rialsijt = α
+ β1Patentijt
+ β2Prior to drug
′s launch in countryijt
+ β3Patentijt ∗Prelaunchijt
+ β4Patentijt ∗Research Exemptionj
+ β5Prelaunchijt ∗Research Exemptionj
+ β6Prelaunchijt ∗Patentijt ∗Research Exemptionj
+ β7Patentijt ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β8Prelaunchijt ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β9Patentijt ∗Prelaunchijt ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β10Patentijt ∗Research Exemptionj ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β11Prelaunchijt ∗Research Exemptionj ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β12Prelaunchijt ∗Patentijt ∗Research Exemptionj
∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ β13Prelaunchijt ∗Patentijt ∗ Innovative Capacity Indexj
+ θ1No. of other countries with product patentijt
+ θ2No product patent ∗Log of No. of other countries
with product patentijt
+ γ1Drug Ageit +γ2Drug Age
2
it +γ3DALYij
+ γ4Years since f irst patent applicationijt
+ Year FE +Country FE +Drug FE + ǫijt ,
Our dependent variable is No. of T rialsijt , defined as the number of trials conducted on the
drug i in country j at year t. Patentijt is the treatment variable, equal to one if drug i has patent
protection in country j in year t. We use several measures of patent protection to verify robustness,
including the existence of any patent, the existence of a product patent, and the number of patents
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on drug i in country j in year t.
The effect of a patent should be smaller for some types of organizations (mainly those with
nonprofit status or engaged in noncommercial research) if a country has a research exception,
since this removes the threat of litigation and the need for a license.7
Therefore, we interact the patent dummy with a dummy for whether a country has a statu-
tory research exemption,Research Exemptionj . We also want to check whether the importance
of patents and research exemptions varies across countries: these are likely to be irrelevant in
countries with almost no research activities, and most salient in places with high innovative ca-
pacities. Therefore, a triple interaction effect is included, i.e., Patentijt ∗ Research Exemptionj ∗
Innovative Capacity Indexj .
After a drug’s launch, experimenters may simply buy the drug and use it as they want under
the doctine of first sale, which means that patent protection should have little impact on follow-on
research. Prior to launch, however, researchers need to acquire the product from the patentholder;
if this is difficult or expensive, cumulative research efforts may be affected. We include a dummy
variable indicating whether the clinical trial began prior to drug i’s launch in country j , as well as
its interaction with the patent, research exemption, and innovative capacity variables.
Additionally, we also include the No. of other countries with product patentijt and the in-
teraction terms of Product Patentijt and No. of other countries with product patentijt to check
whether the investigators tend to relocate the clinical trials across countries to avoid patent pro-
tection in home countries.
Finally, we control for other drug-year covariates, such as years since the first patent applica-
tion for a drug, the age of a drug (years since its first global launch) and its square, and a measure
of the disease burden (measured as disability-adjusted life years) associated with the condition a
drug treats (DALYij ). Drug fixed effects, country fixed effects and year fixed effects are included
in all the regressions. These fixed effects account for the heterogeneity across drugs and countries,
as well time-varying shocks in demand or in clinical trial practices.
The dependent variable is a count variable, which suggests using a Poisson or negative bino-
mial model rather than OLS. The large number of fixed effects, however, makes estimation of non-
linear models more difficult. In addition, the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 126, so its dis-
tribution resembles that of a highly skewed continuous variable. We therefore logNo. of T rialsijt
and all continuous explanatory variables (Disability Adjusted Lif e Yearij , Innovative Capacity
Indexj , No. of other countries with product patentijt).
We repeat this exercise for the trials conducted by the public sector, originators and non-
originators (i.e., organizations that are neither public sector nor an originators or co-developer of
the focal drug). We also estimate this specification for subsets of countries: those ranked in the
top 10 of ICI, those ranked in the top 50 of ICI, and those above the median total trial count.
Future work will include information available for trials registered in the US or EU on drug
7A Bolar exemption is relevant only for generic manufacturers (commercially oriented non-originators). However,
we don’t expect to observe many clinical trials performed for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approval for a generic
drug, as generic firms need only to demonstrate bioequivalence of their products in the US and Europe.
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i’s role in a trial, to distinguish between trials that test for a new use of drug i and trials that use
drug i as a comparator in testing a different compound.
5 Data
5.1 Drug-level data
We focus on drugs first brought to market between 1950 and 2012 for which we can obtain patent
information across countries. Our assumption is that the bulk of the R&D costs required to de-
velop the drug have been sunk by the time the drug is approved for launch in at least one market.
Our interest is in the use of this drug in subsequent research. We determine launch dates of new
products using IMS R&D Focus, and match the sample of drugs to country-level patent informa-
tion provided by IMS Patent Focus. This results in a sample of 1158 drugs.
Table 1 presents a summary of patent status of our drug-level data. The earliest patent on a
drug in our sample was granted in 1950, and the last in 2012. The earliest patent application is a
bit earlier and dates back to 1945 and the last in 2011. On average, these drugs have some patent
protection in 48 countries. The mean number of patents per country is 1571, and with 20.4% of
all the 74,054 patents across countries and drugs expiring by 2012. 21% of drugs over the 1,158
drugs will lose all their patents by 2012. On average, the drug’s launch year is in 1998 and expiry
year is in 2017. The latest patent expiration of the drugs will be in 2031.
5.2 Clinical trial data
Over the last 15 years, regulatory authorities around the world have established registries of clin-
ical trials conducted on pharmaceuticals. For example, the United States created clinicaltrials.gov
in 2000, following the passage of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997.
Section 113 of this act required clinical trials testing drugs for their effectiveness in treating “se-
rious or life-threatening” to be registered. Coverage of this registry was very incomplete until
2005, at which point the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) announced
a policy of requiring registration of any clinical trial described in manuscripts submitted for pub-
lication in major medical journals. Retrospective registration of trials initiated prior to this policy
was permitted, which significantly improved the registry’s coverage. Registration requirements
were expanded by the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 to include a
broader set of trials (beyond “serious and life-threatening” diseases) and trial results, and intro-
duced non-compliance penalties.
National authorities in the European Union began providing information to the EudraCT
database starting in 2004. The clinicaltrialsregister.eu database includes information on phase
II-IV adult clinical trials with investigator sites in the European Economic Area and all pediatric
clinical trials (conducted anywhere) that form part of an application for regulatory approval. The
World Health Organization established a clinical trial registration policy in 2006, and maintains
the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform (ICTRP) to aggregate information from the US,
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EU, Australia, Brazil, China, Korea, India, Cuba, Iran, Japan, Sri Lanka, and the Pan African Clin-
ical Trials Registry.8 Figure 1 graphs the distribution of trials conducted all over the world during
2002-2012. Consistent with registration requirements in the US and Europe, we observe a large
increase in the number of trials registered between 2002 and 2005. Since then, the number of
trials keep above 4500.
Clearly, not every clinical trial conducted around the world is registered. While publicizing
the existence of a clinical trial might facilitate recruitment of participants, trial sponsors often cite
some risks of disclosure, such as interference with patent applications. Zarin et al. [2007], Prayle
et al. [2012] and others have noted problems of incomplete compliance. With these limitations
in mind, this is nevertheless a useful source for information on cumulative innovation. Trials
conducted with public funds are more likely to be registered (this is now a condition of funding
from many agencies), and disclosure of trials conducted by organizations with non-commercial
interests is probably more likely. Academic scientists wishing to publish their work also have
strong incentives to register trials they help to run. We believe the data is most reliable for this
set of organizations.
An alternative is to examine scientific publications that are based on research using patent-
protected materials, such as Murray and Stern [2007] and Williams [2013]. Since this paper fo-
cuses on a broader set of innovations, it is more challenging to identify them in papers than in
clinical trial registries, which include a data element for intervention names. In addition, “failed”
research producing statistically insignificant or unfavorable results might not be published. Be-
cause clinical trials should be registered prospectively, these registries also include unsuccessful
research efforts. Future work should examine both the change in research effort as well as the
change in successful outputs.
We downloaded data on all registered trials on clinicaltrials.gov and the ICTRP in Febru-
ary 2013. We exclude duplicate registrations of the same trial in multiple registries. For each
registered trial, information is available on its sponsors, its start and end dates, its countries of
recruitment, and the condition studied. If the trial is an interventional study, i.e. if a drug is being
tested, then the name of the intervention is also provided. Information on the placebo or control
treatment is included for controlled trials.
We focus on interventional trials that involve one of our sample drugs, either as the interven-
tion or as a control. This requires us to search for each drug name and all of its synonyms in
the intervention fields of the trial data, since interventions may be listed using a drug’s generic
(INN) name or country-specific brand name. Where possible, we distinguish between trials that
are conducted on the drug itself (to find a new use or test a new dosage, for example) and trials
that use the drug as a comparator when testing a different treatment.
We classify academic institutions, government agencies, foundations, and other non-profit or-
ganizations are as “public sector” research institutions. Depending on a country’s definition of
non-commercial, this set is most likely to avail themselves of the research exception where it ex-
8The ICMJE now considers registration on the ICTRP compliant with its policy.
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ists. We define all other sponsors as commercial. This set is more likely to risk infringement if
they use a patented substance without a license, which may be costly to obtain. We also distin-
guish between trials conducted by the original patent applicant, the firms listed as co-developers
on a drug project, and all other firms. This allows us to explore how patents affect the research
efforts of different organization types.
The initial download included 202,171 trials, of which 76,459 study a drug intervention. We
identified 65,180 trials that used at least one of our sample drugs. We restrict our analysis to trials
that started from 2002 to 2012, resulting in 58,463 trials; though trials with earlier start dates exist
in some registries, we felt the coverage was too thin prior to this point. Our final sample of trials
recruited patients in 151 countries.
Figure 2 and 3 shows the distribution of trials across country income groups from 2002 to
2012. Countries are classified using the World Bank’s definition as high income OECD, high
income non OECD, upper middle income, lower middle income, and low income. Countries
without income group definition are categorized in the missing income group. Most trials (far
above 70% of our sample) are conducted in High income OECD countries. The share of these
countries has declined in recent years. To see the trend of other countries, in Figure 3, we exclude
the High OECD countries. It becomes obvious that the lower middle income and upper middle
income groups have experienced a significant increase. The share of trials conducted in the upper
income group grew from 9% in 2002 to 18% in 2012, which is consistent with the finding of Thiers
et al. [2008] that clinical trials are shifting from developed countries to emerging countries.
5.3 Patent data
IMS Patent Focus data provides us detailed information on all the patents associated with each
drug, including their type (product, process or method, etc.), application date, and grant date
at the country level. Patent expiration is generally 20 years after the initial application date,
although some countries grant additional patent terms to compensate for regulatory delays and
others granted shorter patent terms at the time of application.
We match the patent data to the clinical trial data by searching for a drug’s generic name and
any other information on brand names or synonyms in the title, abstract, or intervention fields of
the trial. Grant dates and expiration dates determine whether a drug was under patent protection
at the time a clinical trial began.
Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of drugs losing product patent protection over time. This
figure includes the drugs whose product patents expired globally during 2002-2012, since this
is the period of clinical trials we examine.9. From 2002-2011, on average, there are 30 drugs’
product patent expire each year. As time goes by, there are more and more drugs facing product
patent expiration. To 2012, the trend achieves its peak: around 98 drugs lose their product patents
globally.
9 In this figure, we only consider the drugs whose product patent expires during 2002-2012, while for the regres-
sions, we will include all drugs
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We only focus on the last product patent expiration for each drug globally in Figure 4. To
see the variation of expiry year for each drug, Figure 5 shows us the distribution of the expiry
year lag across countries by drug. Although the largest portion of drugs lose all of their product
patents in the same year across countries (which are around 202 drugs and are excluded in the
figure), there are still quite a few drugs which have more than 2 years of lag between the earliest
patent expiration and the latest (48 drugs have 1 year lag, 30 drugs have 2 year-lag, and 72 drugs
have more than 2 year lag with maximum lag at 10 years), which provides the opportunity for the
investigators to relocate their clinical trials globally.
Figure 6 plots the each country’s share of drug trials by the proportion of drug-year10 observa-
tions on patent. We exclude the United States from this chart for scaling purposes. The association
between the share of trials and propotion of drug-years on patent is non-linear: low income coun-
try observations are concentrated around the origin, with a very small share of trials and a low
proportion of drug-years with patent protection; high income countries have the highest fraction
of drug-years with patent protection and higher share of trials. This pattern suggests that the
importance of innovative capacity may overwhelm any negative effect of patent protection in the
location of research activities.
5.4 Country-level data
Themost challenging component of country-level information concerns the existence and breadth
of the research exemption in patent law. Our primary sources for this information are reports from
the Standing Committee on Patents of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). We
code the existence of a statutory research exemption using Annex 2 of Patent Related Flexibilities
in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the National and
Regional Levels. We also code whether each country’s patent law mentioned an exception for
experimental use and/or noncommercial use according to theWIPO’s Report on the International
Patent System11.
Case law may establish a research exemption even in countries without a statute to that ef-
fect. In addition, while the language of various patent statutes may be similar, the interpretations
can vary. For example, the application of a research exemption to the activities of not-for-profit
organizations is not necessarily uniform. In the Madey vs. Duke decision in the US, the court
noted that universities may have commercial interests in their research, but courts in other coun-
tries may reach different conclusions. We are in the process of defining whether each country’s
research exemption is “narrow” or “broad,” relying primarily on Correa [2004], Garrison [2006],
O’Connor [2009], and others.
Porter and Stern [2001] provide an index of “national innovative capacity” for most countries.
This index is derived from data on patent applicants, the number of scientists and engineers, and
10We use drug-year level rather than drug level because patent protection changes over time, as patents expire.
11We code the experimental exemption, non-commercial exemption and bolar exemption literally based on the le-
gal statements from each countries. And then define research exemption equals to one if the countries either holds
experimental exemption or non-commercial exemption.
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other factors. In our empirical analysis, we use this index or a country’s corresponding rank in
this index as a measure of the relevance of the research exemption and an explanatory variable
for the location of clinical trial activity.
We use several standard sources for other country-level information. Data on disease burden
comes from theWorld Health Organization (WHO) Global Burden of Disease project; we use 2004
age-standardized disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), revised in 2009. Due to the difficulty
matching specific disease conditions listed for each clinical trial to the disease codes from the
WHO, we match the WHO disease codes to the broad therapeutic class assigned to each drug in
our sample, as described in ??. The World Development Indicators from the World Bank provide
the other country variables. We exclude countries that had no clinical trial activity at any point
during 2002-2012. In the end, our analysis focuses on 159 countries.
Table 2 provides an overview for country-specific characteristics. For the 151 countries in-
cluded in our study, 53% of the countries have experimental exemption, and 46.4% of which have
non-commercial exemption. Only 19.9% of the countries have bolar exemption12. The informa-
tion of innovative capacity index is limited: only 54.3% of countries have the Innovative Capacity
Index (ICI). Overall, the country level information is quite incomplete. Therefore, we will try dif-
ferent specifications by varying the countries sample. One alternative is to focus on those coun-
tries which have highest ICI rank (the top 50 ICI rank countries, in the following, we refer them
as ICI 50 countries). Table 3 illustrates the summary statistics for the ICI 50 countries. Within
this group, 80% of which have experimental exemption and 74% of which have non-commercial
exemption, while only 38% of them have bolar exemption. The innovative capacity index ranges
from 16.8 to 30.3 with an average at 22.4. Missing values are greatly reduced in this sample.
Figure 7 shows the number of countries in each income group with exemption ( experimental
exemption, non-commercial exemption and bolar exemption). In each group, the first bar denotes
the number of countries for which we have information on any statutory research exemption.
The second-fourth bar denote experimental, non-commercial exemptions, and bolar exemption
respectively. Overall, the experimental exemption is more prevalent among countries than non-
commercial exemption and bolar exemption. Bolar exemption is much rarely than other types
of exemptions. And research exemptions are more common in high income countries. Lower
income countries have historically had lower levels of patent protection (making exemptions less
meaningful), but we are also missing data for many of them. In robustness checks, we exclude
these countries from our analysis, since the recent introduction of patent rights and low initial
levels of research capacity complicates the interpretation of effects. 13
5.5 Final data
Ultimately, we create a rectangular dataset of drug-country-year observations. Our dependent
variables are the number of clinical trials performed on drug i in country j in year t and the share
12For the case that doesn’t provide exemption, we code it as zero. Therefore, the missing exemption dummies denotes
those which have no statutory exemptions.
13The detailed country information is provided in Appendix Table 1.
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of clinical trials performed on drug i in country j in year t. This yields a fully rectangular14 dataset
of 1,539,747 drug-country-year observations on 1158 drugs and 151 countries from 2002-2012.
Tables 4 and 5 provide summary statistics for all the dependent and explanatory variables
used in our regressions. Table 4 presents the overall information for our main specification (See
Model 1). For each drug-country-year, there are on average 0.075 trials started, in which 43%
(=0.032/0.075) are from public investigators, 36% (=0.027/0.075) are from originators, and 21%
(=0.016/0.075) are from non-originators. 15.9% of the drug-country-year are in patent protection,
and around half of them (0.078/0.159) are in product patent protection. 86.1% of the studies are
conducted prior to the drug’s launch in that country. And 55.6% of the studies are subjected to
the research exemption. The average drug age in our sample is 1.335 years old. The mean years
since first patent application is 2.353 years.
Table 5 provides the summary statistics of the regression data in drug-year level. Overall,
there are 52.5 trials conducted for the drug-year. 35.4% are from public innovators, and 39.1%
are from the originators, and 25.7% are from non-originators. Comparing with the distribution
of trials by organization in drug-country-year level data, we can find that public investigators
tend to conduct clinical trials in more countries than private investigators. In this sample, there
are 63.6% of the drugs in the year have product patent in the US. The average number of other
countries in product patent protection is only 2.1. 98.2% of the drug-year are prior to the drug’s
global launch. While the mean years since the first patent application is only 14 years.
6 Results
Table 6 presents the OLS regression for the baseline model. The trials conducted all over the
world tends to be less responsive to the product patent protection in the US, as the insignificant
coefficients suggests. As the global trials sum up the innovative activities that take place inside
of the US and outsides, both effects might work in the opposite direction and therefore, makes
our estimation difficult to evaluate. Although the number of other country with product patents
has significantly positive effects on the global trials number, but we still can’t distinguish patent
effects which are from home country and those from neighborhood country from this aggregate
level of regression. Intuitively the patent protection from the home country or the neighborhood
country has distinct effects on the sponsor’s location decision. Therefore, more thorough way to
disentangle this question is to consider the innovative activities in drug-country-year level, while
taking into account the country specific characteristics.
Table 8 – 12 investigate the problem as we suggested above in drug-country-year level, chang-
ing the specification in terms of varying fixed effects, interactions, trial sponsors, country sam-
ples, drug samples and patent measures. In Table 8, we address the question by regressing the
Log number of all trials conducted in each country-drug-year on the product patent dummy, pre-
launch dummy, Log of ICI index, research exemption dummy and gradually added fixed effects
14Our dataset is not the usual panel, as panel has two dimensions such as xit , while in our data, each observation has
three dimensions as yijt .
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(Year FE, Drug FE, and Country FE) and interaction terms. Including additional fixed effects and
interaction terms doesn’t alter coefficients much in terms of the sign and significance, except that
the country specific variables become no longer identified.
From Table 9 – 11, we keep the same specification as the last column at Table 8 but vary the
estimation samples. Table 12 replace the important explanatory variable with other two alter-
natives. Year fixed effects (FE), drug FE, and country FE are all included in these tables. And
variance is clustered at drug level. As see from Figure 2 and Table 13, over 90% of the trials are
conducted in Top ICI 50 countries, and there is quite a few missing country specific information
for the lower ranked country ( See Table 2 and 3) , therefore, from Table 9 on, our analysis focuses
on Top 50 ICI ranked countries.
To investigate how innovative behaviors from the public, the originators and the competitors
vary with the patent status of the experimental drugs, in Table 9, we regress the trials conducted
by all sponsors, public sponsors, originators and non-originators separately on the explanatory
variables and controls. Since the country’s idiosyncratic characteristics might also affect the inno-
vative activities and the effects might be most salient for public sponsors, therefore in Table 10,
we focus on public sponsored trials and varys the country range from Top 50 ICI-ranked countries
to top 11th-50th ICI-ranked countries, Top 10 and Top 10 excluding US countries.
Additionally we do another two robustness checks: Table 11 narrows the sample to the trials
conducted on those drugs which have ever been on product patent protection, those drugs which
have ever expired its product patent, or those which have experienced the intellectual property
change (experiencing both the patent on and off process) during the year window we observed
(2002-2012); Table 12 replaces the product patent dummy with other two patent measures: any
patent protection dummy and log of number of patents.
6.1 The main effect of patent protection
Our primary interests lie in the effect of patent on the clinical trial activities. Not surprisingly,
almost all the results from our regression show that the coefficients of patent protection is negative
and statistically significant, even with the different patent measures (Product patent dummy, any
patent dummy, log of number of patent) (See Table 12). However, the total patent effects depend
on many other factors, including the country’s innovative capacity, whether the trial is prior to
the drug’s launch in the country, whether there is statutory research exemption, etc..
Therefore, the interaction terms of patent dummy with other research environment variables
are included and the significance of the coefficients verifies our expection: the effect of patent
protection interwines with other effects. For example, without taking into account research ex-
emption, Figure 8 shows the conditional means of clinical trials by the specific value of patent
dummy, ICI index and pre-launch dummy, which is predicted by the regression in Table 8 col-
umn 3. In the figure, the green line denotes the predicted log of number of trials by ICI index on
drugs with patent protection and post launch. In contrast with the blue line, the clinical trials for
drugs in patent protection are more than twice of those trials on drugs without patent protection
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and post launch.
After introducing research exemption (in Figure 9 for Table 8 column 4), the overall effect of
patent conditional on other explanatory variables remains the same pattern as in Figure 8: the
patent effects is positive, no matter for pre-launch or post-launch, with research exemption or
not. The partial effects of patent protection given other variables (at the means) generated with
margins command in stata confirms that it’s significantly positive. Drugs with patent protection
would increase the number of trials 1.8% on average.
Note that we also include log of number of other countries with product patent, no product
patent * log of number of other countries with product patent in the main specification. In all
the regression with product patent dummy as the major patent measure, the coefficients for these
two variables are insignificant except the robustness check with alternative patent measures (any
patent dummy and log of number of patent), in which case, the more number of other countries
with product patent, the large number of trials are conducted in the home country.
6.2 The effects of research exemption
Most of the evidence shows that the research exemption matters most for the post-launch phase.
Coefficients for the triple interaction terms of patent, pre-launch, and research exemption are
always significantly negative, see Table 10 and 12. The results from the regression over all the
countries are less clear see Table 8 and 18. But from the Figure 9 (corresponding to column 4
in Table 8), we can see it more clearly that the provision of research exemption lowers down the
overall innovative activities, the scale is the largest for the drugs in patent and post-launch. The
overall partial effects of research exemption on number of trials are also significantly negative:
the presence of research exemption tends to reduces the number of trials by 3.2% on average. The
results are striking and count-intuitive since we might expect that research exemption facilitates
the uses of drugs in the clinical trials therefore foster the trial numbers. The potential reason
might be that research exemption coincides with other countries effects which turn out to be a
barrier to the innovation. For example, the US and the Australia don’t have research exemption,
but they may provides other research friendly environment for investigators.
We try to investigate deeply about this issue by seeing the public sector activities by different
country group in Table 10. 15 As shown in the Fig 10 and 11, for the group of country with ICI
ranked between 11 to 50, research exemption promote the innovative activities done by public
sponsors, especially on the drugs which have patent protection and are post-launch. But for the
top 10 countries which locates in the high range of ICI interval, there is no much variation of re-
search exemption in those countries, therefore, we didn’t see much of the effects from it. If we take
a close look at the top 10 countries except the US, (see Figure 13), almost all the countries (except
Australia) do provide research exemption, then we doesn’t have variation and can’t identify the
effect of research exemption.
15The reason we only focus on the public sectors is that public sectors tends to be affected by research exemption
more than other sponsors.
19
6.3 Timing of the drug launch
We are curious about whether the timing of drug launch matters and the direction of the drug
launch on the innovation. As we discussed before, before drug launch, drug products is unavail-
able on market which creates a great barrier for the investigators, which presents more difficult
than patent protection. The results confirm our conjecture: as shown in Figure 8, no matter for the
drugs in patent protection or not, post-launch always leads to a higher level of research activities.
(green line v.s. orange line and blue line v.s. pink line). Additionally, the innovation gap due to
the patent protection ( the difference between green line and blue line) is smaller that those due
to prelaunch ( the difference between green line and the orange line). After introducing the effect
of research exemption (see Figure 9), the above results still hold, although it’s not easy to read
because the lines are overlapped. The partial effect of prelaunch dummy indicates on average the
drug before launch could lower down the number of clinical trials by 4.3%.
6.4 The overall effect of ICI index
Overall, we can see that ICI associates positively with the predicted trial number. From the basic
model in Table 8 column 1-2, we can see that the coefficient of ICI index is significantly positive.
After including country FE, the effect of ICI index is fully captured by country FE and therefore,
we can’t identify it. However, we still can learn more about the ICI index from its interaction
with other variables. Also we can see from the predicted dependent variable by ICI that the slope
of predicted line are almost positive, i.e., investigators are more likely to conduct clinical trials
in countries with higher innovative capacity index. The partial effect of log of ICI index on the
log of number of trials is 4.9% for all the countries on average. That’s to say, when the ICI index
increases every 1%, the number of trials increase on average about 4.9%.
Also note that the slope of ICI with predicted number of trials is the highest for the case
with patent and post-launch (as evidenced by Figure 8- 11), which implies that the innovation
friendly environment matters most in the post launch and patent protected case. The coun-
tries with higher ICI provides important institutional infrastractures or policies that facilitate
the investigators overcome the patent barrier in the post launch phase. The fact that the slope
of ICI with predicted number of trials remains constant across different cases (patent protec-
tion/prelaunch/research exemption) in ICI 10 countries results from the smaller variation of ICI
across these countries (See Figure 12-13).
6.5 The innovative behavior among different sponsors
Wewonder that different sponsors might behave quite differently due to its research objective and
subjects to the different exemption. As public sponsors tend to be more influenced by the insti-
tutional and policy differences across countries than the global private innovators. Therefore, in
Table 18, we explore the trials conducted by different type of lead-sponsors (all sponsors, public
sponsors, originators, and non-originators), corresponding to column 1-4 respectively. We inves-
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tigate the sponsor’s innovation strategy within the ICI 50 countries because most of the developed
countries and newly emerging markets are covered in ICI 50 countries.16
From Table 9, it’s easy to see that the patent effects together with research exemption, ICI and
prelaunch dummy have similar pattern (The sign and the significance are almost the same) to the
trials conducted by different sponsors. But the effects on different sponsors have quite different
scale effects. In comparison with originators and non-originators, public sponsors are more sen-
sitive to the country-specific research environments and patent protection: the coefficients of all
these explanatory variables and their interaction terms are at least doubled (in some case, five
times) for the public investigators than other innovators.
Public investigators tends to innovate much less with the presence of patent protection than
the originators and the non-originators (-4.027 v.s. -2.311/-1.532). However, research exemption
promotes the innovation of public sponsors most in case of patent protection (3.186 v.s. 1.896
/1.266). Drug prelaunch reduced the research exemption effect on public innovation than on
private innovation (-1.605 v.s. -0.297/-0.634). And drug prelaunch also reduced the research ex-
emption effect in case of patent protection on public innovation than on private innovation (-2.784
v.s. -1.000/1.147). Similarly, the national innovative capacity affect most the public investigators
than private investigators, evidenced by all the coefficients of the interaction terms with ICI in-
dex. In one word, public innovative activities are more geographically dependent comparing to
their private counterparts.
6.6 Does country make the difference?
From Table 13, we can find that clinical trials are highly concentrated and unbalanced over the
countries. Over 30% of the trials are conducted in the US. Around 80% trials have ever been
conducted in the top 10 ICI-ranked countries. Observations from the US constitute outliers for
our study. Table 10 focuses on the trials conducted by the public sponsors and restricts the sample
to the trials conducted in those countries which is ranked in the top 50 (top 11-50, top 10, or the
top 10 excluding the US) by innovative capacity index (See column 1-4 respectively). Our aim
is to see whether the public sponsors’ behavior varies across countries, especially inside/outside
the US. The reason of focusing on the public investigators lies in that, as we believe, the private
innovators are the more global ones in contrast to the public sectors and are less subjected to the
geographical restriction.
Table 10 tells us that the US, the other top 10 countries, the top 11-50 countries are all quite
different from each other (as shown in column 2-4). 17 Column 2 and 3 in Table 10 illustrate the
regression results in two distinct subgroups: the countries which is ranked in top 11th-50th and
which is ranked in top 10. The distinction is so salient that: Top 10 countries observations are
16 As we know from appendix Table 1, most of the clinical trials are conducted in these countries. Therefore, we
focus on the sub-sample (ICI 50 countries) for the regression, which provides intensively informative data. But we also
include the trials from all the countries as a robustness check in the appendix.(See Table 18)
17For top 10 countries without the US, due to lack of variations in the country specific variables, there are three
interaction terms are omitted in the regression because of collinearity.
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highly responsive to most of the explanatory variables. Excluding the US changes the coefficients
significantly and in some cases it even shifts the sign, evidenced by the regression exclusive to
the US ( See column 4). For example, patent protection has negative effects on the follow on
research with coefficient -9.217, while after excluding the US, the effect from patent protection
becomes significantly positive, as 1.539. It implies that most of the negative effects are driven by
the observation from the US. Prelaunch has negative effects on the number of trials of other top
10 countries with coefficient -1.739 and it further inhibit the innovative activity in case of patent
protection with coefficient at -0.902; while including the US, the coefficient becomes 10.721 and
5.295. Top 11-50 countries seem to have the similar patterns as the US but with smaller effects.
6.7 Other robostness check
Up to now, we only use product patent dummy as the measure of patent protection as product
patent is the most strong patent that claims exclusivity over the infringement. However, firms
also try to apply for as many as possible patent around their products to protect their exclusivity.
Therefore, the other patent might also play the role in prohibiting the use of the drugs. Therefore,
we also use any patent dummy and log of the number of patents as alternative measures of patent
protection and results are presented in Table 12. For the country in ICI 50, we found that these
three patent measures have similar patterns in the interactions and the single effect. The sign
and significance of the coefficients across the measures are almost the same. Consistent with our
expectation, product patent has stronger effects than other two measures in term of coefficients
size.
Our study so far is devoted to explore all the variations of the patent status across drug, coun-
try and year. Now specifically, we are interested in the drugs which are subjected to patent status
change, that’s to say, it provides us perfect experiments to explore the variations across year for
drugs. In Table 11, by restricting our study on those drugs which have ever been on/off patent
or losing patent protection during 2002-2012 for countries within ICI 50, our sample is largely
reduced, from 499,653 to 124,223 for ever on patent drug, 448,041 for ever off patent drug, and
72,611 for losing patent drug. The coefficients of patent protection are still significantly negative
but with smaller size(-2.002 v.s. -4.027).
6.8 The controls
Besides the patent dummy and its interaction term with other exlanatory variables(research ex-
emption dummy, prelaunch dummy, and ICI index), the controls we take into account include
drug age, drug age squared, year since first patent application, log of DALY and fixed effects of
year/country/drugs.
The results on the control variables reveal that the younger the drug is, the more clinical
trials are conducted on. The result is quite intuitive as the younger the drug is, the less research
attention that ever been focused on and themore research opportunities the drug possesses. There
is almost no non-linear effect on drug age as the square of drug age is insignificant and non sizable.
22
Year since f irst patent application has significantly positive effect on the innovative activities,
however the scale is quite small and negligible. Log of DALY has significantly positive effect on
the clinical trial activities as DALY indicates the potential market value for the specific diseases
and it provides an important incentive for the R&D investment.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the following-on innovation efforts are determined by patent sta-
tus of the original products by exploring the number of clinical trials that conducted on patented
drugs as opposed to the un-patented ones. Because of the regulation on the registration of clinical
trial globally, fortunately we are able to collects most of the clinical trial activities across countries,
which provides a perfect playground to investigate the follow-on innovation built upon the pre-
vious patented innovation and the potential effects of intellectual property system in the modern
continuous innovative process.
Due to variation of statutory provisions about research exemption across countries, our study
is capable of investigating the effect of research exemption and how it interacts with patent pro-
tection. As the vast list of countries provide idiosyncratic political and economical environments
that might promote or hurdle innovation, we propose to utilize the innovative capacity index of
countries to capture the competitiveness in research across countries. We also distinguish the in-
novative efforts that conducted before the drug launch and after as the marketed drug facilitates
the experiments even under patent protection.
Our results reach consistent conclusions across different specifications with varied sample or
alternative patent measures. Our results show that the overall effect of patent protection tends
to promote the innovative activities; post launch drugs facilitate the clinical trial conducted on
them. Research exemption turns out to be associated with lower level of follow-on innovation
activities. Clinical trials tend to conducted in higher ICI countries and the ICI index promotes
more innovative activities in patent protection and post launch case.
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Figure 8: Predicted innovative activities by group(FE2 model)
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Figure 9: Predicted innovative activities by group(Full model)
Figure 10: Predicted innovative activities by group(Full model (Public)ICI 50)
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Figure 11: Predicted innovative activities by group(Full model, Public, ICI 11 50)
Figure 12: Predicted innovative activities by group(Full model, Public, ICI 10)
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Figure 13: Predicted innovative activities by group(Full model, Public, ICI 10 ex US)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics at patent-drug level
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Drug ID 588.377 (333.819) 1 1158 74054
First patent application year 1990.894 (8.282) 1945 2010 73524
Last patent application year 1997.299 (7.726) 1948 2011 73524
First patent grant year 1995.614 (8.907) 1950 2012 69026
Last patent grant year 2002.03 (8.174) 1950 2012 69026
Number of patent in each country 1571.834 (765.968) 1 2911 74054
Number of country in patent protection per drug 48.121 (20.282) 1 107 74054
Patent expires after 2012 0.204 (0.403) 0 1 74054
Drug’s patent expired 0.212 (0.409) 0 1 1158
Launch Year 1998.435 (8.305) 1950 2012 73980
Expiry Year 2017.299 (7.726) 1968 2031 73524
Table 2: Summary Statistics in Country Level
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Experimental Exemption 0.53 (0.501) 0 1 151
Non Commercial Exemption 0.464 (0.5) 0 1 151
Research Exemption 0.556 (0.498) 0 1 151
Bolar Exemption 0.199 (0.4) 0 1 151
Innovative Capacity Index 20.128 (5.023) 11.6 30.3 69
Missing Experimental Exemption 0.47 (0.501) 0 1 151
Missing Non Commercial Exemption 0.536 (0.5) 0 1 151
Missing Research Exemption 0.444 (0.498) 0 1 151
Missing Bolar Exemption 0.801 (0.4) 0 1 151
Missing Innovative Capacity Index 0.543 (0.5) 0 1 151
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Table 3: Summary Statistics in Country Level for ICI 50
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Experimental Exemption 0.8 (0.404) 0 1 50
Non Commercial Exemption 0.74 (0.443) 0 1 50
Research Exemption 0.86 (0.351) 0 1 50
Bolar Exemption 0.38 (0.49) 0 1 50
Innovative Capacity Index 22.408 (3.81) 16.8 30.3 50
Missing Experimental Exemption 0.2 (0.404) 0 1 50
Missing Non Commercial Exemption 0.26 (0.443) 0 1 50
Missing Research Exemption 0.14 (0.351) 0 1 50
Missing Bolar Exemption 0.62 (0.49) 0 1 50
Missing Innovative Capacity Index 0 (0) 0 0 50
Table 4: Summary Statistics for Dependent Var. and Explanatory Var.
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Trials 0.075 (0.690) 0 125 1539747
Public sector trials 0.032 (0.481) 0 104 1539747
Originator trials 0.027 (0.246) 0 21 1539747
Nonoriginator trials 0.016 (0.202) 0 25 1539747
Log(Trials) 0.035 (0.201) 0 4.836 1539747
Log(Public sector trials) 0.015 (0.131) 0 4.654 1539747
Log(originator trials) 0.015 (0.121) 0 3.091 1539747
Log(nonoriginator trials) 0.009 (0.094) 0 3.258 1539747
Patent 0.159 (0.366) 0 1 1539747
Product Patent 0.078 (0.268) 0 1 1539747
Log(Patents) 0.202 (0.526) 0 5.176 1539747
IC Index 1.381 (1.514) 0 3.444 1539747
Prior to drug’s launch in country 0.861 (0.346) 0 1 1539747
Research exemption 0.556 (0.497) 0 1 1539747
Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.067 (0.445) 0 4.357 1539747
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.028 (0.259) 0 4.357 1539747
Drug age 1.335 (4.251) 0 62 1539747
Drug age2 19.858 (95.97) 0 3844 1539747
Years since first patent application 2.353 (6.082) 0 67 1539747
Log(DALYs) 2.488 (1.654) 0 7.772 1539747
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Table 5: Summary Statistics for Dependent Var. and Explanatory Var. for Global Specification
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Trials 52.521 (61.592) 0 453 58380
Public sector trials 18.614 (27.549) 0 246 58380
Originator trials 20.558 (30.721) 0 297 58380
Nonoriginator trials 13.5 (28.685) 0 277 58380
Log(Trials) 3.256 (1.418) 0 6.118 58380
Log(Public sector trials) 2.194 (1.336) 0 5.509 58380
Log(originator trials) 1.954 (1.646) 0 5.697 58380
Log(nonoriginator trials) 1.346 (1.566) 0 5.628 58380
Any product patent in the US 0.636 (0.481) 0 1 58380
Log( # other country with product patents) 2.142 (1.644) 0 4.673 58380
Prior to drug’s global launch 0.982 (0.131) 0 1 58380
Drug age 0.16 (1.63) 0 54 58380
Drug age2 2.684 (45.471) 0 2916 58380
Years since first patent application 13.992 (8.164) 0 60 58380
Table 6: OLS Regression of count of global trials over product patent status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Public Originators Non-originators
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Any product patent in the US −0.053 0.038 0.136 0.140
(0.071) (0.070) (0.103) (0.092)
Log(# other country with product patents) 0.108∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028)
Prior to drug’s global launch −0.365∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.178∗ 0.202 ∗ ∗
(0.064) (0.063) (0.093) (0.083)
Prelaunch*Any product patent in US 0.148 ∗ ∗ 0.112 0.004 −0.089
(0.070) (0.069) (0.102) (0.090)
Prelaunch*Log(# other country with product patents) 0.020 0.023 0.006 −0.021
(0.021) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027)
Drug age −0.010 −0.014 ∗ ∗ −0.013 0.018 ∗ ∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Drug age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Intercept 0.707∗∗∗ −0.608∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ −0.750∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.161) (0.239) (0.212)
N 58380 58380 58380 58380














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: OLS Regression of count of trials, varying fixed effects and interactions
1 2 3 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −0.079∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country −0.001 −0.009 −0.003 −0.005
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 0.062∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.020)
IC Index 0.118∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 0.105∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.019∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.082∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Research exemption −0.005∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Log(# other countries with product patent) −0.001 −0.001 0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Drug age −0.005 ∗ ∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003 ∗ ∗ −0.003 ∗ ∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drug age2 0.000∗ 0.000 ∗ ∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Log(DALYs) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Missing ICI index 0.267∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.007
(0.018) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027)
Missing DALY 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.025 ∗ ∗ 0.025 ∗ ∗







1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −0.015∗
(0.009)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.002
(0.002)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.018 ∗ ∗
(0.009)
Intercept −0.274∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.027)
N 1539747 1539747 1539747 1539747
Adjusted R2 .132 .195 .239 .24
Fixed effects
Year Year Year Year
Drug Drug Drug
Country Country
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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Table 9: OLS Regression of count of trials, by trial sponsor in ICI50
Total Public Originators Non-originators
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −5.285∗∗∗ −4.027∗∗∗ −2.311∗∗∗ −1.532∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.502) (0.220) (0.235)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country 2.276∗∗∗ 1.922∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.202) (0.090) (0.097)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 3.784∗∗∗ 3.422∗∗∗ 1.221∗∗∗ 1.364∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.512) (0.223) (0.243)
1.pp dcy#1.research 4.203∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗ 1.896∗∗∗ 1.266∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.472) (0.214) (0.233)
1.prelaunch#1.research −1.957∗∗∗ −1.605∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.191) (0.088) (0.094)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research −3.038∗∗∗ −2.784∗∗∗ −1.000∗∗∗ −1.147∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.497) (0.225) (0.248)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 1.654∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.157) (0.069) (0.073)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.729∗∗∗ −0.614∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.064) (0.028) (0.031)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −1.183∗∗∗ −1.066∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.160) (0.070) (0.076)
1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −1.280∗∗∗ −0.970∗∗∗ −0.580∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.147) (0.066) (0.072)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.618∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.061) (0.028) (0.030)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.917∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.155) (0.070) (0.077)
Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.002 0.001 −0.000 0.003∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Drug age −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002 ∗ ∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drug age2 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 ∗ ∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗ ∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(DALYs) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Missing DALY 0.022 ∗ ∗ 0.011 0.017∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Intercept −4.459∗∗∗ −3.512∗∗∗ −0.977∗∗∗ −1.169∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.249) (0.105) (0.113)
N 499653 499653 499653 499653





* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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Table 10: OLS Regression of count of trials, varying country samples for public sponsors
Top 50 11-50 Top 10 Top 10 exUS
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −4.027∗∗∗ −1.625∗∗∗ −9.217∗∗∗ 1.539 ∗ ∗
(0.502) (0.262) (1.468) (0.653)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country 1.922∗∗∗ 0.162 ∗ ∗ 10.721∗∗∗ −1.739∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.063) (0.958) (0.352)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 3.422∗∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 5.295∗∗∗ −0.902
(0.512) (0.279) (1.653) (0.681)
1.pp dcy#1.research 3.186∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 10.877∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.472) (0.264) (1.735) (0.015)
1.prelaunch#1.research −1.605∗∗∗ 0.085 −12.460∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.060) (1.095) (0.007)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research −2.784∗∗∗ −0.489∗ −6.002∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.291) (1.840) (0.017)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 1.254∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 2.753∗∗∗ −0.472 ∗ ∗
(0.157) (0.083) (0.439) (0.196)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.614∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −3.220∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.020) (0.287) (0.106)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −1.066∗∗∗ −0.405∗∗∗ −1.588∗∗∗ 0.272
(0.160) (0.088) (0.495) (0.204)
1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −0.970∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗ −3.236∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.083) (0.519)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.508∗∗∗ −0.032 3.734∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.020) (0.328)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.848∗∗∗ 0.141 1.785∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.092) (0.551)
Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.004 0.004 0.001 −0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.001 −0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.006)
Drug age −0.002 ∗ ∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Drug age2 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.001 ∗ ∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Log(DALYs) 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗ ∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Missing DALY 0.011 0.007 −0.017 0.026 ∗ ∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.018) (0.012)
Intercept −3.512∗∗∗ −0.355∗∗∗ −77.549∗∗∗ −72.987∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.093) (5.518) (5.215)
N 499653 397683 101970 91773





* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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Table 11: OLS Regression of count of trials, varying drug samples in ICI 50
Ever on Ever off IP change
b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −2.002∗∗∗ −2.531∗∗∗ −0.585
(0.611) (0.668) (0.501)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country 3.798∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 4.033∗∗∗
(0.644) (0.196) (0.653)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 1.101∗ 2.376∗∗∗ 0.210
(0.647) (0.681) (0.518)
1.pp dcy#1.research 1.596∗∗∗ 2.130∗∗∗ 0.588
(0.577) (0.656) (0.521)
1.prelaunch#1.research −2.944∗∗∗ −1.727∗∗∗ −3.229∗∗∗
(0.615) (0.185) (0.614)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research −0.971 −2.103∗∗∗ −0.452
(0.633) (0.671) (0.543)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 0.619∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.185
(0.191) (0.209) (0.156)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −1.198∗∗∗ −0.650∗∗∗ −1.272∗∗∗
(0.202) (0.062) (0.205)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.338∗ −0.744∗∗∗ −0.067
(0.202) (0.213) (0.162)
1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −0.482∗∗∗ −0.649∗∗∗ −0.174
(0.180) (0.205) (0.163)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.923∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 1.011∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.059) (0.192)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.289 0.643∗∗∗ 0.135
(0.198) (0.209) (0.169)
Log(# other countries with product patent) −0.006 0.005 −0.011
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) −0.005 −0.001 −0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Drug age 0.002 −0.002∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Drug age2 −0.000 ∗ ∗ 0.000∗ −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.001 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Log(DALYs) 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Missing DALY 0.027 0.008 0.041∗
(0.021) (0.007) (0.023)
Intercept −5.537∗∗∗ −3.421∗∗∗ −5.420∗∗∗
(0.643) (0.250) (0.677)
N 124223 448041 72611





* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
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Table 12: OLS Regression of count of trials for all observations, varying patent measure in ICI 50
Product patent Any patent Log(# patents)
b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −5.285∗∗∗ −4.904∗∗∗ −3.019∗∗∗
(0.508) (0.427) (0.224)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country 2.276∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗ 1.363∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.240) (0.244)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 3.784∗∗∗ 3.862∗∗∗ 1.912∗∗∗
(0.523) (0.412) (0.306)
1.pp dcy#1.research 4.203∗∗∗ 3.967∗∗∗ 2.488∗∗∗
(0.483) (0.398) (0.209)
1.prelaunch#1.research −1.957∗∗∗ −1.131∗∗∗ −1.134∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.225) (0.228)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research −3.038∗∗∗ −3.203∗∗∗ −1.601∗∗∗
(0.516) (0.398) (0.305)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 1.654∗∗∗ 1.536∗∗∗ 0.949∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.134) (0.070)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.729∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.077) (0.078)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −1.183∗∗∗ −1.209∗∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.129) (0.095)
1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −1.280∗∗∗ −1.219∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.124) (0.065)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.618∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.072) (0.073)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.917∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.485∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.125) (0.095)
Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.009 0.025∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗ ∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.002 −0.011∗ −0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Drug age −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drug age2 0.000∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(DALYs) 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Missing DALY 0.022 ∗ ∗ 0.006 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Intercept −4.459∗∗∗ −3.293∗∗∗ −2.911∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.283) (0.291)
N 499653 499653 499653


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18: OLS Regression of count of trials, by trial sponsor
Total Public Originators Non-originators
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1.Product Patent −0.089∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.029∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)
1.Prior to drug’s launch in country −0.005 −0.005 −0.002 0.003
(0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch 0.063∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.016 0.021 ∗ ∗
(0.020) (0.010) (0.015) (0.009)
1.pp dcy#1.research −0.037 −0.019 −0.023 0.004
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009)
1.prelaunch#1.research 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research 0.027 0.012 0.016 −0.003
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009)
1.pp dcy#c.log ici index 0.114∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005)
1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.016∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#c.log ici index −0.095∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
1.pp dcy#1.research#c.log ici index −0.015∗ −0.017 ∗ ∗ −0.003 −0.013∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.002 0.005∗∗∗ −0.002 ∗ ∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
1.pp dcy#1.prelaunch#1.research#c.log ici index 0.018 ∗ ∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.001 0.013∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.009 0.003 0.006 0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
No product patent*Log(# other countries with product patent) 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Drug age −0.003 ∗ ∗ −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Drug age2 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years since first patent application 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗ ∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(DALYs) 0.018∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Missing ICI index 0.007 −0.151∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.030 ∗ ∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014)
Missing DALY 0.025 ∗ ∗ 0.012∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.003
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Intercept −0.076∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015)
N 1539747 1539747 1539747 1539747





* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p< .01.
48
